ELEMENTARY LOGIC 



IN 10 CHAPTERS. 



DESIGNED FOR USE IN 



Schools, Academies and Colleges. 



BY 



ALFRED M. BURNEY, A. M., 

PRESIDENT OF HOWARD FEMALE COLLEGE, . 
GALLATIN, TENNESSEE. 



>im 



NASHVILLE, TENN.: 

Wheeler, Osborn & Duckworth Manufacturing Co. 

1884. 



-$l> 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1884, by 

A. M. BURNEY, 
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



60 
PREFACE. 



IF there be any reason why this little book should be published, it 
consists in the following facts : 

1. It places Logic on its true foundation, i. e., the Primary Laws of 
Thought, and presents the elements of the science, together with the 
two processes of Reasoning by Induction and Deduction before the 
exemplification of the subject is attempted ; and submits this as the 
order in which the subject should be treated. 

2. It adapts the subject to the comprehension of the minds of stu- 
dents as well as to that of scholars, and thus makes it attractive to the 
learner. 

With becoming deference we must say that we have found no work 
on Logic since Aristotle's, which lays down the foundation, the 
elements and processes of Reasoning and builds thereon, although 
they all, in some subsequent part of the book, teach that the Primary 
Laws of Thought constitute the foundation, and give the elements and 
processes as though they were secondary matters. 

The plan here insisted upon is that these should come first and con- 
stitute the basis of the structure. 

The question, whether any other work has pursued this plan or not, 
is hereby submitted, and, with its decision, the fate of this volume will 
be determined. 

There is no occasion for criticism, nor controversy on the point sub- 
mitted, for the works are now all before the public, and will show for 
themselves. 

We acknowledge ourselves greatly indebted to many excellent works 
on Logic published on different plans for the matter contained in this, 
and especially to that admirable Elementary Treatise by Henry 
Coppee, known as " Coppee's Elements of Logic." 

We lay no claim to originality, except in a solitary instance to be 
found in Chapter IV., on the subject of Imperfect Induction, and the 
general plan of treatment which is our own, and which we claim is 
peculiarly attractive to the youthful learner. 

A. M. BURNEY. 

September i, 1884. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



PART I— SIMPLE LOGIC. 

Chapter I. — 

Logic Defined and Analyzed. 

Syllabus. 

Practical Questions. 

Chapter II. — 

The Elements of Logic Explained. 

Syllabus. 

Practical Questions. 

Chapter III. — 

Logic as the Art of Reasoning. 

Syllabus. 

Practical Questions. 

Chapter IV. — 

Reasoning by Induction and Deduction. 

Syllabus. 

Practical Questions. 

Chapter V. — 

The Syllogism. 

Syllabus. 

Practical Questions. 

Chapter VI. — 

Figure and Mood of Syllogism. 

Syllabus. 

Practical Questions. 



6 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

PART II— COMPLEX LOGIC. 
Chapter VII. — 

Complex Syllogism. 

Syllabus. 

Practical Questions. 

Chapter VIII. — 
Fallacies. 
Syllabus. 
Practical Questions. 

Chapter IX. — 

Peculiar Mode of the Syllogism. 

Syllabus. 

Practical Review. 

Chapter X. — 

The Socratic Method of Reasoning. 

APPENDIX. 

Practical Examples. 

General Examples for Practice. 

Parliamentary Rules. 



LOGIC. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE SUBJECT DEFINED : ITS ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 

1. The word Logic is derived from the Greek Logos, a 
word or discourse which has many shades of meaning, and 
hence the diversity of subjects to which Logic has been 
applied. 

It is not our purpose to enter the fruitless controversy so 
long waged as to what Logic should or should not embrace, 
preferring rather to accept the definition generally given and 
confine it to the scope thus legitimately assigned to it by that 
definition. 

3. Logic has generally been defined as the Science of Rea- 
soning, or the Art of Reasoning, and inasmuch as we must 
know how to reason before we can practice it, and as the Art 
thus necessarily embraces the Science, we prefer to define it 
as the Art of Reasoning, and shall so use it in this treatise. 

4. In the analysis of Logic which we propose in the sub- 
sequent pages, we shall see that the Dictum of Aristot/e is the 
groundwork of the syllogism. 

In like manner that same great philosopher has given us the 
principle of contradiction as the groundwork of all reasoning. 
This principle of contradiction is a primary law of thought, and 
is generally given in the classification as the first law of 
thought. The classification of these laws is as follows : 



IO LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

PRIMARY LAWS OF THOUGHT. 

i. The Law of Contradiction. 

2. The Law of Identity. 

3. The Law of Excluded Middle. 

These laws describe the very simplest truths, in which all 
people must agree, and embrace all notions which we can 
conceive. It is impossible to think correctly without them; 
hence, on them all reasoning must ultimately depend. 

We merely refer to them here as the basis of reasoning and 
give the definition of each, reserving the full explanation and 
application of these laws till we come to exemplify Logic 
itself. 

1. The Law of Contradiction means that, Nothing can both 
be and not be. 

2. The Law of Identity means that, Whatever is. is. 

3. The Law of Excluded Middle means that, Everything 
must either be or not be. 

5. Having defined the subject and given the basis on 
which reasoning rests, we now propose to give 

AN ANALYTICAL VIEW OF LOGIC. 

1. Logic is the Art of Reasoning. 

2. Reasoning expressed in language is called an argument. 

3. The simplest and ultimate form of an argument is the 
Syllogism. 

4. The Syllogism is composed of three propositions, called 
the Major Premise, Minor Premise and the Conclusion. 

5. These three propositions, when legitimately connected in 
the form of the Syllogism, contain three terms, and only three, 
which are each used twice, and are called respectively, the 
Major Term, the Minor Term, and the Middle Term. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. II 

The first two must not be confounded with the Major and 
Minor Premises on account of similarity of name. 

6. A Term is an act of Apprehension. 

-j. An Act of Apprehension is a pure conception by the 
mind of an object apprehended. The mind has three facul- 
ties of primary and original knowledge — consciousness, per- 
ception and intuition. By consciousness we gain a knowl- 
edge ot the empire of mind itself; by perception we cognize 
the empire of matter; and by intuition we cognize those 
entities that are neither mind nor matter, such as space, 
duration of time, personal identity, cause and effect, infinity 
and substance. 

When the mind through either of these primary faculties 
cognizes anything, as for instance, existence by consciousness, 
matter by perception, or space by intuition, the act of cogno- 
nition in each case is an act of apprehension. 

Here we reach the elementary principle — apprehension, the 
lowest stage in the Analysis of Logic. Here the mind ceases 
to analyze, to take parts, and begins the opposite process of 
Synthesis, to build up. 

When the mind apprehends an object, i. e., seizes it by appre- 
hension, it seeks a medium to express its act of apprehension. 
This medium it finds in words which in turn become terms, 
which in the form of expression become propositions, which, 
when legitimately connected, form the Syllogism, which is the 
ultimate form of an argument, and an argument expressed in 
language is reasoning. 

We have thus indicated the process of Synthesis, and in 
order to make it still plainer, will submit the following : 

SYNTHETICAL VIEW OF LOGIC. 

i. An Act of Apprehension gives us a Term. 

2. The three terms, technically called the Major Term, the 



12 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

Minor Term, and the Middle Term, when properly arranged, 
give us the three propositions of the Syllogism. 

3. The three propositions, technically called the Major and 
Minor Premises and the Conclusion, when legitimately con- 
nected, form the Syllogism. 

4. The Syllogism based upon Aristotle's Dictum is the sim- 
plest form of an argument. 

5. An argument is reasoning expressed in language. 

6. Reasoning expressed in language is the Dictum of the 
Primary Laws of Thought. 

7. The Art of Reasoning, based upon the Primary Laws 
of Thought, is Logic. 

This completes the Synthesis and brings us back again to 
our subject, which is Logic. Analysis and Synthesis, the two 
processes of method in the study of Logic, are thus exhibited 
to acquaint the student with the elements of Logic, their names 
and /unctions. We will now give a topical review of this 
chapter, which wc denominate a 

SYLLABUS. 

We have said that Logic is derived from the Greek Logos, 
which has many meanings, but is in this treatise defined to be 
the Ait of Reasoning. That we are indebted to Aristotle for 
the Law of Contradiction as the groundwork of Reasoning as 
well the celebrated Dictum the groundwork of the Syllogism. 
That this Law of Contradiction is a Primary Law of Thought and 
generally considered as the first of the three Primary Laws of 
Thought, which are as follows : 

1. Contradiction — Nothing can both be and not be. 

2. Identity — Whatever is, is. 

3. Excluded Middle — Everything must either be or not be. 
These will hereafter be explained and applied as the 

groundwork of ail Reasoning. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 13 

Then follows the analytical view of Logic, which shows it 
to be composed of seven elements, namely: The Art of Rea- 
soning, the Argument, the Syllogism, the Proposition, the Term, 
the Apprehension, the Conception. 

The mind ceases to analyze on the Act of Apprehension 
and changes to the opposite process of Synthesis, thus com- 
bining, 1, Apprehension into Term ; and 2, Term into 
Proposition ; and 3, Proposition into Syllogism ; and 4, Syllo- 
gism into Argument; and 5, Argument into Reasoning; and 
6, Reasoning into the Primary Laws of Thought; and 7, the 
Art of Reasoning into Logic, our subject. 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. 

1. How is Logic defined? 

2. Why the Art, rather than the Science of Reasoning? 

3. What is the groundwork of Reasoning ? 

4. Give the meaning of Contradiction. 

5. Name and give the meaning of the other two laws of 
Thought. 

6. What is a Primary Law of Thought? 

7. Name the seven elements of Logic as shown in the Syn- 
thesis given. 

8. Repeat these elements synthetically in order. 

9. What is our exact subject ? 

10. What branches of learning, must a student understand 
before he can pursue Logic successfully ? 

"thus endeth the first chapter." 



ns 



CHAPTER II. 

THE SEVEN ELEMENTS OF LOGIC EXPLAINED. 

1. An Act of Apprehension, the ultimate element in our 
analysis of Logic, is a pure conception by the mind of an 
object apprehended, thus, "to die for one's country is glorious." 
The words "to die for one's country" constitute the conception 
because they express exactly what the mind conceives to be 
"glorious." It takes all these words to express the concep- 
tion in this proposition, and no more. Sometimes the 
conception is expressed by one single word, as man is mortal. 
The word man alone expresses the conception in this case, 
which is called a simple act of apprehension. Sometimes it is 
expressed by a number of words as "to die for one's country" 
as above, which is called a Complex Act of Apprehension. The 
Indian tribes of the West seem to understand how to express 
the complex, apprehension as indicated by their Christian 
names, such as " Old- Man- Afraid-of -his- Horse," " Young A/an - 
Afraid-of his-Horse," " Spotted Tail" etc. 

When the Act of Apprehension is simple it gives us a 
simple term, and when it is complex it gives us a complex term. 
It is of the utmost importance that the Act of Apprehension 
should be a true as well as a pure conception. The greatest 
care should therefore be exercised in ascertaining in all cases 
hist what the act of Apprehension is, and also exactly what 
words should be used to express it, for when expressed in lan- 
guage it becomes one of the thiee terms of the Syllogism. If 
the Act of Apprehension is in any way faulty it will taint the 
whole argument. 

Let it be remembered that it is not the words but the pure 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 15 

conception of what they express that makes the Act of Appre- 
hension, and this Act of Apprehension makes the Term. 

2. A Term in Logic is the Act of Apprehension expressed 
in language. There are three and only three terms in the Syllo- 
gism, and they are technically called the Major, the Minor 
and the Middle Terms. 

EXAMPLE. 

All men are mortal. 
All Americans are i/ie/i. 
All Americans are mortal. 

Here '■'■Mortar' is the Major Term, because it includes 
the greatest number of persons. " Americans " is the Minor 
Term, because it includes the least number of persons. 
'■'■Men'''' is the Middle Term, because it is the medium of 
comparison between the other two terms. 

Each of these terms is used twice, and when properly 
arranged they give rise to the three propositions of the Syllo- 
gism, which we next notice. 

3. A Proposition in Logic is the legitimate expression of 
the agreement or disagreement between terms, as Cromwell 
was a hero ; Brutus was not a patriot. Here agreement is 
expressed between Cromwell and hero, the two terms, and 
this makes it a proposition. In like manner disagreement is 
expressed between Brutus and patriot, and this constitutes it 
a proposition. 

The three propositions, technically the Major and Minor 
Premises, and the Conclusion, so arranged that the Middle 
Term is a medium of comparison between the major and minor 
terms, form the celebrated Syllogism of Aristotle, which we 
will next explain. 

4. The Syllogism of Aristotle is the Procrustean Bedstead 
of all arguments, the ultimatum of all argumentation, the 



1 6 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

elementary form and test, the court of last resort, to which 
all arguments and modes of reasoning must finally come. 

The basis of the Syllogism is Aristotle's Dictum, which, 
literally translated, is this : Whatever may be predicated of a 
whole class, may be predicated of each individual contained in the 
class. 

Upon this principle the stagirite, that ancient Dialectitian, 
constructed the celebrated Syllogism which has come down 
to us unimpaired through a period of more than two thousand 
years, apd which, now as then, is composed of three proposi- 
tions, and three terms which have been already explained. 

EXAMPLE. 

All men are mortal. 
All Americans are men. 
All Americans are mortal. 

The Major Term " 'Mortal" is first compared with "Men" 
the Middle Term, then Americans the Minor Term is com- 
pared with "Men" the Middle Term, and finding that they 
agree both with the same third term they will agree with each 
other, hence we compare them directly with each other and 
declare their agreement, which forms the Conclusion. 

5. An Argument consists of two parts, that to be proven, 
and that by which it is to be proven. That by which it is proven 
is embodied in the premises ; and that to be proven is em- 
bodied in the Conclusion. 

When these parts are stated in their natural order and sim- 
plest form they constitute the Syllogism. But when they are 
inverted, so that the Conclusion is stated first, it is called the 
question, and the premises are joined to it by the word because 
as the reason. 

Q. The basis of Reasoning is the Law of Contradiction 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 1 7 

with its associate laws of Identity and Excluded Middle, the 
three forming the " Primary Laws of Thought." 

Contradiction is thus explained : Nothing can have, at the 
same time and place, contradictory qualities, for instance a 
piece of paper can not be both white and black at the same 
time and place. It may be white at one time and black at 
another, and white in one part and black in another, but can 
not be both at the same time and place. All propositions 
implying contradictory qualities are impossible and false, and 
so because they violate this Law of Contradiction. 

Identity teaches that everything is itself, and not another, 
that is identical with itself. 

Excluded Middle teaches that there is no middle or third 
course in affirming things and qualities. When the question 
is asked as to these things and qualities the answer must be 
yes or no. If you are asked whether gold be white or not 
white, you must answer yes or no. You must affirm that it is 
white or that it is not white. You can not answer the ques- 
tion by saying that it is yellow, although that may be true. 
Yet it is an excluded middle. 

7. Reasoning or Ratiocination is the simple act of the 
mind by which we deduce the conclusion from known premises 
which are before the mind, thus having before us the two 
known propositions as premises to-wit : 

All men are mortal. 
Washington was a man. 

The mind deduces the conclusion that Washington was mortal, 
although it is not directly affirmed. This mental process is 
Reasoning. 

It matters not to what subject it may be applied, it is 
Reasoning, for there is but one universal principle of Reason- 
ing. We have no such thing as li Mathematical Reasoning" 
2 



iS LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

and "Moral Reasoning," as distinct processes; but it is the 
one principle as above described, whether applied to Mathe- 
matics, Physics or Metaphysics. A mind well versed in 
Mathematics may reason well on that subject, but it must do 
so according to the one principle of Reasoning. 

The reason is the same, whether we reason by the method 
of Induction or Deduction ; and the Syllogism is equally 
applicable to both these methods, as will be shown here- 
after. 

SYLLABUS. 

The student is advised to make himself thoroughly 
acquainted with these seven elements before proceeding further. 
Let him learn that an Act of Apprehension is the elementary 
principle — the ultimate element.; that it is all important that 
this should be a true conception as well as a pure one ; that 
this is determined by the primary laws of Thought; that the 
law of Contradiction declares that a thing is or is not — it can 
not be and not be. Identity proclaims that whatever is, is; 
that if a thing is it is ; and Excluded Middle declares that 
there is no middle course, that a line is either straight or 
not straigt; it can not be a third thing between straight and 
crooked. It may be difficult at first to distinguish between 
the meanings of the Law of Contradiction and the Excluded 
Middle — the meaning of Contradiction is at once self-evident. 
The meaning of Excluded Middle is equally as evident, but 
not so readily perceived. 

Let it be rememembered that an Act of Apprehension 
expressed in language is a term ; that terms make propositions 
and propositions make the Syllogism, and the Syllogism is the 
form of every argument, and every argument is reasoning 
expressed in language, and the performance of all this is the 
art of reasoning, which is Logic — our subject. 



LOGIC IN TO CHAPTERS. 19 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. 

1. Repeat by name the seven elements in order. 

2. What is an act of Apprehension ? 

3. What is a Term ? How many kinds? 

4. What is a logical proposition ? 

5. Of what is the Syllogism composed ? 

6. Explain the three Primary Laws of Thought 

7. Explain Ratiocination. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 



CHAPTER III. 

LOGIC AS THE ART OF REASONING. 

1. We have already seen that we are indebted to Aristotle 
for the Law of Contradiction as the basis of Reasoning, as 
well, as the Dictum, the basis of the Syllogism. In like man- 
ner, we are also indebted to him for the very ground work of 
all sciences. That venerable stagirite and profound dialecti- 
tian about 350 years B. C. declared: "All science must set 
out from something already known ; in a word, must have its 
first principles or grounds (dp%ai), which are not themselves 
science, but the result of immediate cognition" which he distin- 
guishes from strict science, but calls it certainty. (See Anal., 
Part I., 1.; Eth. Nic. V., 3.) Dr. Thomas Reid, the great 
common-sense Philosopher, uses the very same expression 
(dp%ai) as the first principles of science. We may not won- 
der then, that Aristotle is called the master mind of antiquity, 
since he has given us the basis of the Syllogism, of the Rea- 
soning, and of all sciences. Logic was denominated by 
Aristotle as dialectic, and was considered by Plato as the 
regulator of all sciences, the all-comprehensive science whose 
object is eternal truth, and is therefore possible and knowable 
only to God; yet, the true ideal at which the soul of man 
should ever aim in order to become Godlike. 

2. We now propose to erect our superstructure on the three- 
fold foundation given by Aristotle. For other foundations 
hath no man fhan that of the first principles of sciences, the 
Laws of Thought, especially that of Contradiction, and the 
dictum of the Syllogism, the great "instrument of all demon- 
stration." 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 2 1 

Before we can reason at all we must know; must know 
whereof we reason ; must know that we ourselves exist, and 
that the external world exists; n.ust know the ego and the 
non-ego. 

3. Our Beneficent Creator has so constituted us that we 
know these ground principles, and we know them in such a 
way as to require no proof of them. They are immediate 
cognitions, mental axioms. This original knowledge is given 
as the capital stock for the acquisition of more knowledge ; 
and it is not the property of a few philosophers, but is, as 
Dr. Reid says, the common sense and heritage of all the race. 

Consciousness is the root of our knowledge. It is a witness 
to the mind of its operations. It testifies to the knowledge 
obtained by the mind through both the internal and external 
perception, so that we are conscious of the internal acts and 
states of our own minds, and conscious of the perception of 
the external world. This knowledge we cannot doubt. It is 
a certainty, a self-evident certainty. Here we begin. 

4. We begin with the known and proceed to the unknown, 
the only method for the acquisition of knowledge. 

The human mind, endowed with this original stock of 
knowledge, knows that it knows. It apprehends its own acts 
and states, and also external objects. This constitutes an 
Act of Apprehension, the simplest and ultimate element of 
Logic. The mind utters this Act of Apprehension in lan- 
guage, and then it becomes a term. The mind, having two 
such terms before it, proceeds by its own processes to declare 
that these terms agree or disagree. For instance, we have the 
two terms line and straight. The first Law of Thought, which 
is contradiction, declares that the line is straight or not straight. 
It cannot be both, it must be one and not the other. This 
peclaration is a proposition either affirmative or negative, ac- 
cording as agreement or disagreement is declared. 



2 2 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

5. With propositions thus obtained, and known to the 
mind to be true, it next proceeds, by one of its faculties called 
Comparison, to compare others known to be true, and deduce 
therefrom a third proposition, called the conclusion, which 
arises out of the known propositions as premises by compar- 
ing the two terms, heretofore not known to agree> with the 
same third term as a medium, with which both having 
agreed, are now axiomatically declared to agree with each 
other. 

This completes the process of Reasoning, and brings us to 
. a conclusion known to be certain. Thus starting on our original 
stock of knowledge, which is certain, we acquire other 
knowledge, and reduce it at the same time to certainty. We 
thus go on from one acquisition to another, adding to our 
faith knowledge, and to our knowledge certainty, throughout 
the vast domains of science. 

It was in this manner, adding round after round of knowl- 
edge in spiral ascent up the "Hill of Science," that Aristotle, 
Descartes, Reid, and Hamilton reached the summit. 

6. To know the process now described is to know Logic 
in its elements; to perform the process is to practice Logic. 
The former is the Science of Reasoning; the latter is the Art 
of Reasoning. 

We now propose to illustrate the process by an example. 

Let it be remembered that we must have some knowledge 
in order to obtain other. We know who John the Baptist 
was, and we know what a priest is. But we do not know 
immediately whether he was a priest or not. Hence we must 
seek this information through a medium. We know from the 
Bible that there were many priests, and that all the sons of 
priests were themselves priests. But the Bible is silent as to 
John the Baptist being a priest. Yet it tells us that he was the 
son of Zacharias the priest. Now let us take what we do 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 23 

know, and try to find out what we do not know. We have 
two terms, Baptist and priest, and we do not know whether 
they agree or not. 

We select another term, to-wit, "Son of a priest," and 
compare the other two with it, and if they both agree with it, 
then of a certainity they will agree with each other, for the 
axiom says so. We thus compare them : 

The sons of piiests were themselves priests. John the 
Baptist was a son of a priest. Therefore John the Baptist 
was a priest. 

We now know mediately what we before did not know im- 
mediately, yet we know it as certainly as if we had known it 
immediately, because the conclusion partakes of the certainty 
of the premises. 

7. Again, the Constitution of the United States provides 
for the election of the President, and eighteen of our citizens 
have been President, and enjoyed all the honors and emolu- 
ments, of the office. But the Constitution has not declared 
a single one of them President by name or person ; and if we 
deny this process of reasoning by mediate inference, we deny 
facts that are known and acknowledged to be true by the 
civilized world, to-wit, that each of these eighteen men has 
been President of the United States during certain periods of 
time in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries A.D. The 
Constitution has only declared that in the election "the per- 
son having the greatest number of votes shall be the President." 
It says nothing about George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
nor James K. Polk as President, yet each of these distin- 
guished men has filled that position. Without mediate infer- 
ence they could never have been known as Presidents. The 
process is simply this : 

" The person having the greatest number of votes" is the 
medium of comparison, i. e., the Middle Term. President 



24 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

is the Major, James K. Polk is the Minor Term. The axiom 
says that things that agree with the same thing agree with 
each other. Now, if both the Major and Minor Terms agree 
with the Middle, we may unhesitatingly declare that James 
K. Polk was President of the United States. Let us try it. 

The person having the greatest number of votes shall be 
President. 

The President of the Senate declared that James K. Polk 
had the greatest number of votes in 1845. Therefore James 
K. Polk was President in 1845. 

Deny this process, and there is no power on earth by which 
it can be made out that James K. Polk was ever entitled to 
the office (which he filled with so much credit to himself and 
profit to the country.) 

Wc therefore lay this down, not as a convenient method of 
reasoning, or one by which men may reason, but as the prin- 
ciple by which they must reason, although in many cases they 
may not be aware of the fact and may not know the rules and 
principles by which they reason. 

SYLLABUS. 

We have presented this chapter in seven sections, and 
would advise the student to explain to himself the matter con- 
tained in each thus : 

He should explain the three great principles for which we 
are indebted to Aristotle, and state what Dr. Reid has said of 
one of them ; what Aristotle called Logic, and Plato's views 
of the subject. 

Explain on what this treatise is founded, and why; also 
what is said of this original stock of knowledge, its certainty 
and use. State where all sciences must begin and how, and 
proceed. How the first element of Logic is obtained; and 
then elaborated into the Syllogism ; and then give the axiom 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 25 

on which this mediate inference is based. Explain how it was 
shown that John the Baptist was a priest, and that James K. 
Polk was once President, and give the Syllogism in each case. 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. 
Let the student explain each of the seven sections. 



26 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 



CHAPTER IV. 

REASONING BY INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION. 

1. Reasoning proceeds upon the Primary Laws of Thought 
as its basis by two methods — Induction and Deduction. 

Induction is the method of Reasoning by which we discover 
laws from individual facts and causes from effects. 

Deduction is the reverse method of deriving facts from 
laws and effects from causes. 

To correspond with these two methods, Aristotle made two 
sorts of Syllogisms, the one Inductive and the other Deductive. 
The former sets out from particulars already known, and 
reaches general conclusions. The latter sets out from some 
general and admitted principle, and reasons to a particular 
conclusion. These are the only strictly scientific procedures, 
and we will now illustrate each by an example. 

2. We submit as an example a Syllogism of Complete In- 
duction, and reserve what is generally called Incomplete In- 
duction for a more thorough consideration hereafter. 

EXAMPLE OF INDUCTION. 

Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Nep- 
tune all revolve around the Sun in elliptical orbits. 
These are all the planets. 
Therefore all the planets revolve about the Sun in elliptical orbits. 

The above is on the supposition that these are the only 

planets. 

EXAMPLE OF DEDUCTION. 

All the planets revolve about the Sun in elliptical orbits. 

Jupiter is a planet. 

Therefore Jupiter revolves about the Sun in an elliptical orbit. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 27 

These will serve to illustrate the two methods of Induction 
and Deduction. 

' 3. We propose to treat Induction under the usual divisions 
of Complete Induction and Incomplete Induction. 

We have already given an example of Complete Induction, 
and will only add that it owes its name to the fact that in this 
process a complete examination of all the individuals or facts 
may be made and declared. 

Thus, Jesse had seven sons. One had been chosen king, 
and Samuel was sent to anoint him without knowing which 
it was. He caused six to pass before him for inspection and 
refused them all. If he had stopped at this his induction 
would not have been complete. But he completed it by sending 
out for David, the lad attending the sheep, and anointing him 
king. 

The Dictum for this kind of Induction is this : 

' ' Whatever is true of all the constituent parts is true of the 
constituted whole. " 

4. Incomplete Induction is defined to be that process of 
induction which takes a part of the individuals or facts known 
to represent all the remaining ones, and for this reason it has 
been adjudged not certain in its conclusions. 

The name and nature of this method of induction are cal- 
culated to impress the mind of the young with the idea that 
its results are uncertain, yet this is the very process from 
which the greatest part of all our knowledge is derived, and 
especially is this true in the sciences. It therefore presents 
the most interesting question connected with the whole sub- 
ject of Induction. The question is this: On what principle 
are inductions deemed sufficient, short of complete enumera- 
tion of all the particulars ? 

We answer, "Our confidence in the uniformity of Natural 



28 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

Laws is the principle." This confidence is embodied in the 
words which we denominate the Canon : 

" Under the same circumstances and with the same sub- 
stances the same effects always result from the same causes." v/ 

5. All experience teaches us that order, regularity, and 
uniformity prevail in the universe, in the " cosmos" which 
means order ; and caprice, chance-work, and uncertainty are 
excluded. If it were otherwise the universe would crumble 
into chaos. 

While it is conceivable that any one of the natural laws 
might be reversed — and it is certain that some of them have 
been miraculously suspended on great and important occa- 
sions — yet our reliance upon their permanence is simply un- 
limited. The thought that there will be no more daylight 
after to-day; that the water from the spring today would 
destroy the life which it refreshed yesterday; that a stone 
would remain suspended mid-air instead of falling, never 
enters our minds except as an idle whim cr an amusing fancy. 

6. Let us examine a few examples of this so-called In- 
complete Induction in the light of the canon already an- 
nounced, and see if it answers fully the question propounded. 

Let us first appeal to Mathematics. Euclid, in his 5th 
Proposition of Geometry, takes a single triangle and proves 
that its opposite angles are equal, and says not a word about 
any other triangle. But from this one experiment he proceeds 
to declare that any and all Isosceles triangles have their op- 
posite angles equal, and the world cries Amen to the conclu- 
sion ! 

Again, if we take the first two odd numbers, 1 and 3, and 
add them, the sum will be 4, just twice the number of terms 
used. Then 1 -f- 3 + 5 = 9, just three times the number of 
terms used. Then 1 — |— 3 -|- 5 -)- 7 = 16, which is four times 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 2Q 

the number of terms, and so on indefinitely. Now shall we 
go on ad infinitum, and examine all the combinations that 
might be made, or is not this sufficient to declare the conclu- 
sion, which is, that if we take any series of consecutive odd 
numbers, commencing with unity, and add them, the sum will 
be equal in every case to the number of terms multiplied by 
itself. Who can longer doubt this truth ? Is not the Induction 
in both these cases sufficient ? Do we not act on the conclu- 
sions as certainties ? But let us get out of the domain of Math- 
ematics, for some have peculiar notions about that science. 

7. The chemist analyzes one pound of water and finds it 
composed by weight of eight parts of Oxygen and one of 
Hydrogen. He analyzes another pound with precisely the 
same result, and another, and so on with like results, till he 
has analyzed ioo pounds of water taken from various parts of 
the earth. Is he not now authorized to declare with certainty 
that all water is composed of eight parts of Oxygen and one 
of Hydrogen by weight ? 

Let us see if he is not so authorized. Let us examine this 
question in the light of the Primary Laws of Thought. 

Suppose the chemist comes upon a substance, after a thou- 
sand trials, that seems not to conform to his former analysis. 
The Law of Contradiction, which is the first that takes hold 
of it, declares that the substance cannot be water and not 
water. It is either water or not water. It cannot be both at 
the same time. 

The Law of Identity says whatever is water is water. The 
Law of Excluded Middle says the substance is water or not 
water, there is no third thing between these two — water and 
not water, no "tertium quid." If then the substance in ques- 
tion is water, it is composed of eight parts Oxygen and one 
of Hydrogen, and conforms to the universal analysis. If it is 
not water, the chemist has made no declaration concerning it 



30 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

whatever. Therefore his declaration that water is composed 
of eight parts Oxygen and one Hydrogen is a certainty. 

8. A certain man had one hundred sheep, and one was 
"gone" astray. Now instead of leaving the ninety-nine, 
suppose he puts them into the hands of a skillful naturalist to 
have them classified, and receives the report that they are all 
quadrupeds, which is universally acknowledged to be true. 
Now what shall we conclude about the one that is gone astray? 
Simply and truly that it is also a quadruped. For Contradic- 
tion says it is a sheep or not a sheep. Identity says if it is a 
sheep it is a sheep. Excluded Middle says it is not a thing be- 
tween sheep and not sheep. Then, if it is a sheep, it is a 
quadruped. If it is not a sheep, nothing has been affirmed 
concerning it. But it must either be a sheep or not a sheep. 
Therefore, in either case, it must be a quadruped or nothing 
is asserted. 

Postulated, that it is a sheep, we affirm with certainty that 
it is a quadruped. 

It being now settled that these one hundred are sheep and 
quadrupeds, shall we not with equal certainty affirm that all 
sheep are quadrupeds? Or must we examine each one before 
the Induction is sufficient? The only point to settle is, are 
they sheep ? If they are, Identity says, all sheep are identical, 
and therefore quadrupeds. 

9. Are there no cases in which doubt and uncertainty may 
arise from incomplete and unfinished Induction ? 

We answer that if doubt and uncertainty arise in any case, 
it is not from incomplete induction, but from ambiguity of lan- 
guage, and a misunderstanding of the principle of Identity, the 
plainest principle of thought. 

To illustrate this point, let us consider a case in point, and 
from it "Judge all." 

At one stage of Astronomical Science it was decided that 



LOGIC IN TO CHAPTERS. 31 

there were only seven planets in the solar system. Afterwards 
others were discovered, until the number of Major and Minor 
Planets now exceeds one hundred, and still others will likely 
be discovered. All that have been examined are found to 
move about the Sun in elliptical orbits. Now the question is, 
can we affirm with equal certainty that all planets hereafter to 
be discovered and examined will be found to revolve about the 
Sun in elliptical orbits? Our answer is that we can. For the 
Astronomical meaning of a planet is "a celestial body which re- 
volves about the Sun in an orbit of a moderate degree of eccen- 
tricity. " — Webster. 

Now, if other heavenly bodies should be hereafter discov- 
ered. Contradiction says they will either come under this defi- 
nition or they will not. If they do, they are planets, and if 
planets, we can with equal certainty affirm that they revolve 
about the Sun in elliptical orbits. If they are not planets, 
then we can still affirm with certainty that all planets do so re- 
volve. 

The truth in every conceivable case depends, Tst, on a just 
Classification; 2d, on just Definitions. If the classification be 
vague, or the definition inadequate, uncertainty and error will be 
the result; yet, it will not be the fault of the Induction, but 
the fault of mis-classification, or inadequate definition after the 
work of induction is done. 

As, for instance, astronomers in the future may discover 
new heavenly bodies, and classify some among planets which 
do not meet the conditions defined above. This would be 
an error of classification. We may catch fish and not string 
them ; so we may perform induction and not classify correctly. 

10. We therefore conclude that it is not necessary to cer- 
tainty that the Induction should be complete, but rather that 
Incomplete Induction may give us equal certainty, provided 
it is performed with proper caution, and attended with just 



32 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

classifications and adequate definitions, which are necessary steps 
in all philosophical investigations. 

If it be said that these are necessary parts of Induction, we 
answer that they sustain the same relation to induction that 
assorting and stringing fish sustain to catching them. 

Let it ever be remembered that Logic has nothing to do 
with the subject-matter of propositions ; it deals with them as 
presented, and is not responsible for errors in classification 
and definition. 

Let it be remembered that when a just classification has 
been made, and an adequate definition given, the great Canon 
of Induction declares " under the same circumstances and with 
the same substances, the same effects always follow the same causes, 
and result from them." 

Interferences and impediments to the operation of natural 
laws remove such instances from the Canon, and render them 
exceptional cases, for which there is no rule. 

SYLLABUS. 

This chapter is devoted mainly to the subject of Induction, 
which is divided into Complete and Incomplete Induction. 
The former is that whose enumeration includes all the facts 
and individual instances; the latter is that whose enumeration 
does not include all the instances. The conclusions of the 
former are considered certain, and it is here shown that those 
of the latter are not less so. The Syllogistic example of the 
planets is given to illustrate complete Induction, while two 
Mathematical, and two examples from Natural Sciences are 
given to illustrate Incomplete Induction. The student is ad- 
advised to turn to them and point them out as named, and 
explain their bearing fully. The question as to what principle 
guides us in the number of instances to be examined to secure 
certainty is answered by the general Canon, which the student 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 33 

must master fully, as well as show how the Primary laws of 
thought are applied in this chapter. 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. 

i. Show how Induction and Deduction are opposite pro- 
cesses of the one principle of Reasoning. 

2. Explain Complete Induction, and give the Syllogistic 
example, also the example of Deduction. 

3. What is Incomplete Induction ? 

4. What question has been raised on it? How answered ? 

5. Give the C mon and apply it to each of the examples 
given to illustrate the certainty of such Induction. 

6. Do doubt and uncertainty arise from Incomplete Induc- 
tion ? 

7. From what do they arise? 

8. Illustrate this from the science of Astronomy, using the 
planets as examples. 

9. What two necessary steps mentioned ? 

10. State the conclusion of the whole matter. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE SYLLOGISM. 

Having shown that the Syllogism is both inductive and de- 
ductive, and may be applied to both methods of Reasoning, 
with the remark that Induction is the d posteriori process, i. e., 
the process of reasoning from effects to causes, and Deduction 
is the d priori process, i. e., the process of reasoning from 
causes to effects, we will pass to the consideration of the 
Syllogism in its fullest sense. We have already explained its 
composition and application to all forms of argument. 

Syllogism is the common name for Mediate Inference, and 
differs from Immediate Inference only in the employment of 
the Middle or third Term as the Medium of comparison be- 
tween the other two terms. Thus, when we cannot compare 
two terms immediately with each other, we compare each 
with some third term, and note their agreement, or difference, 
as, if we wish to compare two rooms in size, we cannot place 
one in the other, but we may compare each with a measuring 
rule, and declare their relative dimensions. The measuring 
rule is the medium of comparison. 

SPECIAL RULES OF THE SYLLOGISM. 

i. Every Syllogism has three and only three terms — Major, 
Minor, and Middle. 

2. Every Syllogism is composed of three and only three 
propositions — Major and Minor Premises, and the Conclu- 
sion. 

3. The Middle Term must be distributed, i. e., taken in its 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 35 

whole comprehension at least once in one of the premises, 
and must not be ambiguous. 

4. No term must be distributed in the conclusion which has 
not been distributed in one of the premises. 

5. From negative premises no conclusion can be drawn. 

6. If one premise be negative the conclusion must be nega- 
tive. 

7. From two particular premises no conclusion can be 
drawn. 

8. If one premise be particular the conclusion must be par- 
ticular. 

These rules are essential to the Syllogism, and the student 
is advised to commit them to memory for ready use, as well 
as make himself thoroughly acquainted with what they teach. 

We will now illustrate each rule by examples, mentioning 
them only by their number. 

The first rule is violated when a Syllogism has more or less 

than three terms. 

EXAMPLE. 

A Bank is a financial institution. 

The margin of a stream is a bank. 

Therefore the margin of a stream is a financial institution. 

Here we have four terms : i, bank; 2, margin of a stream; 
3, bank; 4, institution; and this makes it the error of Ambig- 
uous Middle, there being no medium of comparison between 
the Major term, "Financial institution," and Minor, " Margin 
of a stream." 

According to Rule 2d we must have three propositions. 
Since propositions are the legitimate expressions of terms, 
and we have three terms, of course we must have three propo- 
sitions, thus : 

All men are mortal. 
Washington was a man. 
Washington was mortal. 



36 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

The first compares men and mortal. The second compares 
Washington and man. The third declares the agreement of 
Washington, the Minor term, with "mortal," the Major term. 

According to Rule 3d the following would be an error of 

undistributed Middle, thus : 

v 

All Frenchmen are Europeans. 
All Germans are Europeans. 

There is no medium of comparison, and hence no conclu- 
sion. The Rule also requires the terms to be univocal, i. e., 
have the same meaning in both premises, and thus avoid the 
error of ambiguous Middle. 

Rule 4th forbids us to distribute any term in the conclusion 
which has not been distributed in the premises. 

This is evident from the Syllogism, whose sole object is to 
prove the conclusion by the premises, and not independently of 
them, thus: 

Nations capable of self-government should not be op- 
pressed. 

Many nations are capable of self-government ; therefore no 
nation should be oppressed. 

The error here is that the minor term "many nations" is 
particular in the minor premise, and is made universal in the 
conclusion, i. e., that is, distributed in the conclusion when 
it was not so distributed in the minor premise. 

This is technically called "illicit process" of the minor 
term. It is more common in the major term, and more diffi- 
cult to detect. 

Thus for example : 

All Anglo-Saxons love liberty. 
The French are not Anglo-Saxons. 
Therefore the French do not love liberty. 

The "major term" "love liberty" is not distributed in the 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 37 

major premise, for Anglo-Saxons are only a part of those who 
love liberty, and the major term should have embraced all 
who love libeity. This is called the fallacy of illicit process of 
the major term. 

Rule 5th is founded on the principle that inference can only 
proceed from propositions that agree. Thus : 

Americans are not Europeans. 
Mexicans are not Europeans. 

Here both terms disagree with the Middle Europeans, and 
no conclusion can be drawn ; yet they may agree with each 
other, for there is a sense in which Mexicans are Americans, 
i. e., inhabitants of the American continent. This is called 
the fallacy of negative premises. 

Rule 6th depends on the axiom that two terms agreeing 
with the same third term agree with each other. For a nega- 
tive proposition asserts disagreement, and the conclusion must 
be negative to carry out that disagreement. 

Rules 7th and 8th are not self evident, but are only corol- 
laries to the subjects of Illicit Process and Undistributed 
Middle, already explained in the 3d and 4th Rules. 

SYLLABUS. 

This chapter sets forth that the Syllogism is applicable alike 
to induction and deduction, to the a posteriori and the a priori 
processes of reasoning; that it is the common name for 
mediate inference, which differs from immediate inference 
only in the use of the middle term. Thus, having been 
told that Alexander was the son of Phillip of Macedon, 
we infer immediately that Phillip was father of Alexander. 
This is inferred without a medium. But we cannot infer im- 
mediately that Phillip was a great warrior, for he might have 
been a failure in war. But when we know that those who 
have conducted great military campaigns with success are 



38 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

called great warriors, we only have to know that Phillip was 
of that number, and then we infer mediately that he was a 
great warrior. 

After this follow the eight Rules of the Syllogism, six of 
which are self-evident, and the other two are corollaries. The 
student is advised to master these fully, and learn on what 
principles they are founded, for it is only in this way that we 
become acquainted with that most important form of argu- 
ment, the Syllogism. 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. 

1. Explain the a priori and the a posteriori processes. 

2. Explain immediate inference, also mediate. 

3. Explain Rule the 3d. 

4. Give the reason of Rule 4th. 

5. Why no conclusion from negative premises. 

6. Explain the reason of the 6th Rule. 

7. Give a summary of the chapter. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 39 



CHAPTER VI. 

FIGURE AND MODE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 

1. Having presented the Syllogism, and the rules essential 
to it, we now propose to explain the Figure and Mode as ap- 
plied to the Syllogism. 

Logic recognizes four kinds of Propositions, which are des- 
ignated by the four letters ; A. E. I. O., to-wit : 

1. The Universal Affirmative Proposition — A. 

2. The Universal Negative Proposition — E. 
3- The Particular Affirmative Proposition — I. 
4. The Particular Negative Proposition — O. 

EXAMPLES OF EACH. 

All men are mortal is a universal affirmative proposition, be- 
cause it affirms mortality of all men. 

No men are trees is a universal negative proposition, be- 
cause it denies the predicate to all men. 

Some men are wise is a particular affirmative, because it 
affirms wisdom of a particular part of men only. 

Some men are not wise is a particular negative proposition, 
because it denies wisdom to a particular part of men. 

2. Figure in Logic is the technical name for the classifica- 
tion of syllogisms according to the position of the Middle 
Term. 

As the Middle Term can have only four positions in the 
Syllogism, there can be only four figures, which are thus ex- 
plained : 

The first figure is always known by the Middle Term being 
the subject of the major premise, and predicate of the minor. 



4-0 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

The second figure is always known by the Middle Term 
being predicate of both premises. 

The third figure is always known by it being the subject of 
both premises. 

The fourth figure is always known by it being the predicate 
of the major premise, and subject of the minor, which is the 
reverse of the first figure. 

MODE OF SYLLOGISMS. 

The Mood of a Syllogism is the manner in which the Syllo- 
gism is constructed out of the different kinds of logical propo- 
sitions, which we have just shown to be four, designated by 
the letters A. E. I. O. 

Now, if we have a Syllogism constructed out of three uni- 
versal propositions, the symbols will be A. A. A., and we call 
it the Mood of Barbara, which is a meaningless word, and 
entirely arbitrary, but has been adopted by logicians from the 
fact that it combines the three A's necessary to denote three 
universal affirmative propositions. The word Bavara would 
have done as well as Barbara if it had been selected, since all 
the moods of the first figure are perfect, and do not need to 
be reduced, as those of the second, third, and fourth figure re- 
quire to be. 

We now submit a simple Syllogism to illustrate this mood 
of Barbara : 

A. All men are mortal. 
A. All Americans are men. 
A. All Americans are mortal. 

Here are three universal affirmative propositions, and as 
each is designated by A, the Syllogism is constructed in the 
mood of Barbara. 

2. We have now defined mood, and given one mood and 
explained it, but the student now wishes to know how many 
moods he will have to deal with. We answer, that the nnm- 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 41 

ber of moods depends, i, upon the number of propositions 
in a Syllogism, which are three; 2, upon the number of cate- 
gorial propositions which can enter into the Syllogism, which 
we have already said is four, to-wit, A. E. I. O. It therefore 
simply requires us to arrange these four letters, A. E. I. O., 
in three columns in every possible combination which will give 
us just sixty-four combinations, and hence sixty-four moods. 

3. But as many of these combinations will violate the 
rules and axioms for the valid Syllogism already given, they 
are for this reason discarded. 

Thus all combinations of affirmative premises having negative 
conclusions must be set aside because they violate the axiom. 
And all combinations of negative premises, with whatever 
conclusions, are useless. And all sets of particular premises, 
whatever be the conclusions, must be set aside. 

Discarding all such invalid moods, we have only eleven 
valid ones left, and applying these to the four figures we 
would have 4 X XI .= 44 moods; but we find many of these 
which are valid in one figure are not valid in another, and for 
this reason we discard about twenty, and find five more 
useless, which leaves only nineteen valid modes in all, or four in 
the first figure, four in the second, six in the third, and five 
in the fourth. 

We now give these moods in the four figures in the Latin 
verse as to sound and scansion, but with no intrinsic meaning 
in the words : 

Figure I. Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. 

Figure II. Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Falzoro. 

Figure III. Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Dokamo, 
Feriso. 

Figure IV. Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison. 

The vowels in these words designate the moods, thus 
"Cesare" gives us E. A. E., which shows the mood to be 



42 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

two universal negatives and one universal affirmative proposi- 
tion. 

Some of the consonants are very useful, also, in showing 
us how to reduce the imperfect moods of the second, third, and 
fourth figures to the perfect moods of the first figure, which 
will be explained under the head of Reduction. 

EXAMPLES UNDER THE FIGURES AND MOODS. 
Figure I. 
Barbara. 

A. Every desire to gain by another 's loss is covetousness. 
A. All gaming is a desire to gain by another 's loss. 
A. All gaming is covetousness. 

Celarent. 
E. No one who is enslaved by his own appetites is free. 
A. Every sensualist is enslaved by his appetites. 
E. No sensualist is free. 

Darii. 

A. All pure patriots deserve the rewards of their country. 

I. Some warriors axe pure patriots. 

I. Some warriors deserve the rewards of their country. 

Ferio. 
E. Nothing that impedes commerce is beneficial to the revenue. 
I. Some taxes impede commerce. 
O. Some taxes are not beneficial to the revenue. 
These are Aristotle's four original perfect moods, to which 
the others may be reduced. 

Figure II. 
Cesare. 
E. No vicious conduct is praiseworthy . 
A. All truly heroic conduct is praiseworthy. 
E. No truly heroic conduct is vicious. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 43 

Camestres. 

A. All true philosophers consider virtue a good in itself. 
E. No advocate of pleasure considers it a good in itself. 
E. No advocate of pleasure is a true philosopher. 

Festino. 
E. No righteous acts will produce ultimate evil to the actor. 
I. Some kinds of association will produce ultimate evil to the 
actor. 

O. Some kinds of association are not righteous acts. 

Fakoro. 
A. All true patriots are friends to religion. 
O. Some great statesmen are wot friends to religion. 

0. Some great statesmen are not true patriots. 

Figure III. 
Darapti. 
A. All wits are dreaded. 
A. All wits are admired. 

1. Some admired (persons) are dreaded. 

Disamis. 

I. Some lawful things are inexpedient. 
A. All lawful things are what we have a right to do. 
I. Some things which we have a right to do are inexpe- 
dient. 

Datisi. 
A. All that wisdom dictates is right. 
I. Something that wisdom dictates is amusement. 
I. Some amusement is right. 

Fe tap ton. 

E. No Science is capable of perfection. 

A. All Science is worthy of culture. 

O. Something worthy of culture is not capable of perfec- 
tion. 



44 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

Dokamo. 

O. Some noble characters are not philosophers. 
A. All noble characters are worthy of admiration. 

0. Some (persons) worthy of admiration are not philoso- 
phers. 

Feriso. 

E. No false theories exist in a perfect state. 

1. Some false theories are harmless things. 

0. Some harmless things do not exist in a perfect state. 

Figure IV. 

Bramantip, 
A. All oaks are trees. 
A. All trees are vegetables. 

1. Some vegetables are oaks. 

C a menes. 
A. All miracles are things of rare occurence. 
E. No things of rare occurrence make a slight impression on 
the mind. 

E. No (things which) make a slight impression on the 

mind are miracles. 

Dimaris, 

I. Some taxes are oppressive. 

A. All that is oppresive should be repealed. 

I. Some things which should be repealed are taxes. 

Fesapo. 

E. No immoral acts are proper amusements. 

A. All proper amusements are designed to give pleasure. 

O. Some things designed to give pleasure are not immoral 

acts. 

Fresison. 

E. No acts of injustice are proper means of self-advance- 
ment. 



LOGIC IN lO CHAPTERS. 45 

I. Some proper means of self-advancement are unsuccess- 
ful. 

O. Some unsuccessful efforts are not acts of injustice. 

( These Examples are copied from Coppee^s Logic. .) 

The conclusions of the fourth figure are indirectly stated, 
and rather accidentally stumbled into than employed inten- 
tionally, and hence this form of the argument is not often 
used. 

The first figure is in exact accord with the dictum of Aris- 
totle, and all its moods are perfect. 

The second figure is used to disprove an argument or state- 
ment that has been made. Thus, suppose it had been af- 
firmed that 

All great men are true patriots. 

We may refer this to Fakoro, of the second figure, for refu- 
tation, using great men instead of great statesmen. 

The third figure is useful when we have singular terms 
which are subjects of propositions, and never predicate ; and 
also when we wish to sustain an objection to our opponent's 
premises, which is particular, when the case requires a universal 
proposition. 

REDUCTION DIRECT AND INDIRECT. 

It is said that any imperfect mood, that is, a mood in the 
second, third, or fourth figure, can be reduced to the perfect 
mood, which is the first figure; and the dictum immediately 
applied. 

Reduction is of two kinds — direct and indirect. 

The former proves in a perfect mood the same conclusion, 
or, being converted by inference, gives the same conclusion 
which was reached in the imperfect mood. The latter does 
not prove the same conclusion to be true, but its contradic- 
tory false, which establishes the same conclusion. 

Let us take an example in Cesare, Figure II. : 



46 LOGIC IN 10 CHAPTERS. 

E. No men are trees. 
A. All oaks are trees. 
E. No oaks are men. 

By simple conversion : 

No trees are men. 
All oaks are trees. 
No oaks are men. 

This is indicated by the letter s in Cesare, which denotes 
simple conversion ; and we simply convert the major premise, 
which makes it a Syllogism of the first figure and perfect 
mood. 

This leads us to remark that certain letters in the mnemonic 
words used to designate the moods indicate the process of re- 
duction, and when we see these letters they are a sign to us 
of what process we should employ to convert that mood. 
The letter s denotes simple conversion of the major premise, as 
already shown; the letter k shows that the major premise is to 
be converted by negation. Thus, All good men are virtuous, 
is converted by negation when we say, All not virtuous are not 
good men ; the letter m denotes the transposition of the pre- 
mises, i. e., placing the last first; the letter/ denotes conver- 
sion by limitation, i. e., instead* of saying, All men are animals , 
limit by saying, Some men are animals. 

Instead of going through all the imperfect moods, we ap- 
pend a tabular view of reduction, usually given to direct pu- 
pils in the performance of the work. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 
TABLE OF REDUCTION. 



47 



MOOD TO BE 
REDUCED. 


WILL 

RED UCE 

TO. 


PROCESS OF REDUCTION. 




Cesare 


Celarent 


(s) Convert major premise simply. 




Camestres 


Celarent 


(m) Transpose the premises, (s & s) Con- 
vert the minor premise and con- 
clusion simply. 


Fig. II. < 


Festino 


Ferio 


(s) Convert the major premise simply. 




Fakoro 


Fer'io 


(k) Convert the major premise by nega- 
tion. 




. D?.rapti 


Darii 


(p) Convert the minor premise by limi- 
tation. 




Disarms 


Darii 


(m) Transpose the premises, (s & s) Con- 
vert the minor premise and con- 




Datisi 


Da i 


clusion simply, 
(s) Convert the minor premise simply. 


Fig. Ill 


Felapton 


Ferio 


(p) Convert the minor premise by limi- 
tation. 




Dokamo 


Darii 


(k) Convert the major premise by nega- 
tion, (m) Transpose the premises. 




Feriso 


Ferio 


(s) Convert the minor premise simply. 




' Bra man tip 


Barbara 


(m) Transpose the premises, (p) Con- 
vert the conclusion by limitation. 




Camenes 


Celarent 


(m) Transpose the premises, (s) Convert 
the conclusion simply. 


Fig. IV.. 


Dimaris 


Darii 


(m) Transpose the premises, (s) Convert 
the conclusion simply. 




Fesapo 


Ferio 


(s) Convert the major premise simply, 
(p) Convert the minor premise by 
limitation. 




Fresison 


Ferio 

• 


(s & s) Convert the major and minor pre- 
mises simply. 



INDIRECT REDUCTION. 

Regarding the subject of indirect reduction, more curious 

than practical among students, we will give the rules usually 

used in its performance, and direct the student who wishes to 

learn it to take the rule in connection with the tabular state- 



4-6 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

ment given for direct reduction, and he can work it out for 
himself. 

RULES FOR INDIRECT REDUCTION. 

I. Take the contradictory of the conclusion in the second 
figure and proceed with it as you would Fakoro. 

II. Take the contradictory of the conclusion for the major 
premise in the third figure and proceed as you would with 
Darapti of that figure. 

III. Take the contradictory of the conclusion for the minor 
premise in the fourth figure and proceed as you would with 
Bramantip in the table. 

SYLLABUS. 

This chapter sets out to teach us Figure and Mood. Figure 
is a technical name in Logic which is employed to designate 
the classification of the Syllogism according to the position 
of the middle term. 

When the middle term is subject of the major premise, and 
predicate of the minor, the Syllogism is in the first figure. 

When it is predicate of both premises the Syllogism is in 
the second figure. 

When it is subject of both premises the Syllogism is in the 
third figure. 

When the middle term is the predicate of the major and 
subject of the minor the Syllogism is in the fourth figure. Re- 
verse the first figure and it gives the fourth. Reverse the 
second and it gives the third, and vice versa. 

Mood is the manner of constructing the Syllogism out of 
the four logical propositions. If we so construct the Syllo- 
gism that the major premise be a universal proposition and 
negative, the minor be universal and affirmative, and the con- 
clusion be a universal negative, it will be in the mood E. A. E., 
which we arbitrarily call Celarent. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 49 

The possible combinations of the three propositions of the 
Syllogism, and the four categorical logical propositions, are 
sixty-four in number, but many of these, for reasons given in 
this chapter, are thrown aside as useless and invalid, which 
leaves us only nineteen valid moods, as heretofore explained. 

Now we request the student t<, make himself familiar with 
all the figures and moods and their distinctions. 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. 

1. What is Figure in Logic? 

2. State the position of the middle term in each. 

3. What is mode in Logic? 

4. State the number of possible combinations of logical 
propositions in moods. 

5. State the number of valid moods. 

6. Give the premises for this conclusion : 

"All oaks are trees." 

7. Give the Syllogism for this : 

All is not gold that glitters. 

8. Give the Syllogism for this : 

Jesus Wept. 

9. Make a Syllogism of this : 

No man can perform a miracle. 

10. Classify this : 

One hat costs four dollars. 
Four hats cost four times four dollars. 
Therefore four hats cost sixteen dollars. 
4 



COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS. 



CHAPTER VII. 

I. THE ENTHYMEME. 

This word is derived from two Greek words combined into 
one, and means to conceive in the mind. Hence it is the name 
of a Syllogism, with one premise suppressed, that is conceived 
in the mind and not expressed. Thus : 

Caesar is a man, 
Therefore .Caesar is mortal, 

is an enthymeme with the major premise conceived in the 
mind and not expressed. ' Or we may suppress the minor pre- 
mise and it will read thus : 

All men are mortal. 
Therefore Caesar is mortal. 

The major premise is the one usually suppressed, as it is 
the one to which assent is readily given. 

II. THE SORITES, OR CHAIN ARGUMENT. 

Sorites is from the Greek, and means a collection. Hence, 
it is an abridged argument, consisting of a series of proposi- 
tions, in which the predicate of the first is the subject of the 
second, and so on until we combine the subject of the first and 
predicate of the last to form a conclusion. Thus : 



52 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

The mind is a thinking substance. 

A thinking substance is a spirit. 

A spirit has no composition of parts. 

That which has no composition of parts is indissoluble. 

That which is indissoluble is immortal. 

Therefore the mind is immortal. 

This may be expressed in four simple Syllogisms, as, 

A thinking substance is a spirit, 
The mind is a thinking substance, 
The mind is a spirit, 

and so on. 

This is a simple and powerful form of an argument, in 
which the mind, starting with the only minor term mind, links 
it with each middle term by jumping from one to another till 
it reaches the appointed conclusion. 

If we desire to establish the effect of a republican govern- 
ment we may say : 

The Americans make their own laws. 
Those who make their own laws are free. 
Those who are free are contented. 
Those who are contented are happy. 
Therefore the Americans are happy. 

HYPOTHETICAL SORITES. 

A collection of conditional propositions so arranged that 
the consequent of each becomes the antecedent of the next, 
forms a hypothetical Sorites, and the conclusion comes from 
either affirming the first antecedent with the last consequent, 
or by denying the last consequent with the first antecedent. 
Thus : 

If the Bible is from God it should be taught. 

If it should be taught men must teach it. 

If men must teach it they should be supported. 

But the Bible is from God, therefore its teachers should be supported. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 53 

THE EPICHIREMA. 

This word is from two Greek words which, taken together, 
mean seizing with the hands, and it is the name of a very 
powerful form of argument, and one that was a favorite 
weapon with the disputatious Greeks. 

The Epichirema requires each premise to be established 
separately before the conclusion is drawn, i. c, it lays violent 
hands on the proof first. Thus : 

The victors are injured by war ; because it hardens their hearts: 
The French were victors at Marengo, for they retained the field ; 
Therefore the French were injured by their victory. 

All true patriots are friends to religion, because it is the basis of 
national prosperity; 

Some great statesmen are not friends to religion because they reject 
its teachings ; 

Therefore some great statesmen are not true patriots. 

HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 

This is a Syllogism formed out of hypothetical propositions. 

There are two and only two kinds, the constructive and de- 
structive Syllogisms. 

In the constructive form we use the whole conditional propo- 
sition as the major premise ; we affirm the antecedent for the 
minor premise, which gives us the affirmation of the conse- 
quent for the conclusion. Thus : 

If he has a fever, he is sick. 
He has a fever, 
Therefore he is sick. 

The destructive is the negative form. Thus : 

If he has a fever, he is sick. 

He is not sick, 

Therefore he has not a fever. 



54 LOGIC IN 10 CHAPTERS. 

CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS. 
These contain a condition in the major premise. Thus: 

1. If the fourth commandment is binding upon us we must observe the 

Sabbath ; 
But the fourth commandment is binding upon us, 
Therefore we must keep the Sabbath holy. 

2. If taste is uniform all men will admire the same objects ; 
But all men do not admire the same objects, 

(One sees beauty where another sees deformity.) 
Therefore taste is not uniform. 

DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM. 

A disjunctive Syllogism is one whose major premise is a 
disjunctive proposition, and minor a categorical. 

EXAMPLE. 
Brutus was either a parricide or patriot. 
He was not a parricide, 
Therefore he was a patriot. 

THE DILEMMA. 

This is a compound argument composed of conditional 
propositions, upon which we reason disjunctively. 

If there be two conditional Syllogisms joined with a minor 
premise that is disjunctive, it is called a dilemma; if three, 
it is called trilemma, etc. But we use dilemma in a generic 
sense to designate all these forms. 

EXAMPLES. 

If /Eschines joined in the public rejoicings, he was inconsistent. 

If he did not, he was unpatriotic. 

But he either did, or did not join. 

Therefore he was either inconsistent or unpatriotic. 

The dilemma is the jaw-bone with which Pyrrho, the giant 
sceptic, was slain. He put forth the sweeping proposition that 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 55 

" Nothing is true."' " Everything is false and contradictory." 
Here is the celebrated weapon that slew Scepticism and re- 
deemed Philosophy. It was addressed to Pyrrho thus : 

If what you say is true, then there is something which is not false, and 

your doctrine is wrong. 
If what you say is false, then it has no value as an argument, and again 

your doctrine is wrong. 
But what you say must be either true or false. 
Therefore in either case yuur system is wrong. 

If you can prevent the birds from flying over your head, you should 

do so, and not fret about it. 
If you cannot prevent them, it is useless to fret about it. 
But you either can or cannot prevent them. 
Therefore it is useless to fret about the birds flying over your head. 

SYLLABUS. 

The object of this chapter is to explain and exemplify the 
various kinds of Complex Syllogisms. 

We will now review them in the order in which they have 
been presented. 

i. The Enthymeme denotes that a part of the Syllogism is 
conceived in the mind, and hence omitted in the expression. 
It is always one or the other premise that is suppressed, and 
generally the major. 

2. The Sorites, or chain argument, is a collection of simple 
Syllogisms, so arranged as that the predicate of the first be- 
comes the subject of the second, and so on, until we can 
combine the subject of the first with the predicate of the last 
for a conclusion. 

This is a convenient form of an argument in support of 
great truths, such as the immortality of the mind. 

3. The Hypothetical Sorites is composed of conditional 
propositions so arranged as that the consequent of each be- 
comes the antecedent of the next, and so on till the conclu- 



56 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

sion is reached by either affirming the first antecedent with 
the last consequent, or the last consequent with the first ante- 
cedent. 

4. Please notice the etymology of the Epichirema, and it 
will go far toward fixing its potency as an argument upon your 
mind. The idea is that it lays hands on the proof as it walks 
in triumph to the conclusion. 

5. We next have the Hypothetical Syllogism, which is 
formed out of hypothetical propositions, either constructively 
or destructively. Look over the explanation and example 
given in the treatment of it, and you will understand it. 

6. The Conditional Syllogism is formed out of conditional 
propositions in such a wav that the affirmation of the conse- 
quent will follow the affirmation of the antecedent. 

7. Passing over the Disjunctive Syllogism, which may be 
learned by reference to that head, we remark that the 
Dilemma is one of the most powerful forms of the Complex 
Syllogisms. It is compound, and combines two conditional 
Syllogisms, with a disjunctive minor premise. Examine care- 
fully the examples given, and see if they correspond with the 
explanation of the dilemma. 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. 

1. Explain the Enthymeme and the example given. 

2. Explain the Sorites and its example. 

3. Explain the Hypothetical Sorites and repeat the example. 

4. Explain the Epichirema and show its use by the example. 

5. Explain the Hypothetical Syllogism and give the ex- 
ample. 

6. Explain the Conditional Syllogism and give the example. 

7. Explain the Dilemma, Trilemma, etc., and give the two 
examples, and explain them fully as to construction. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 57 



CHAPTER VIII. 

FALLACIES. 

A Fallacy is an invalid argument, which has the appearance 
of being valid, and when used to deceive, it is called a sophism. 

Fallacies are first divided into formal, i. e., fallacies in dic- 
tionc, and fallacies in the subject-matter, i. e., extra dictionem. 
The former is a logical fallacy, and the latter is a non-logical 
fallacy. But in order to show the difference between them, 
so that they may not be confounded, each will now be ex- 
plained. 

FORMAL FALLACIES. 

These are logical fallacies, and therefore violate the dictum 
of Aristotle, as well as the axioms and rules for determining 
the validity of an argument. 

There are five fallacies of this kind, which are the follow- 
ing : 

1. Undistributed middle terms. 

2. Illicit process of either term. 

3. Negative premises. 

4. Affirmative conclusion from negative premises, and vice 
versa. 

5. More than three terms in an argument. 

As a matter of caution we will state that these fallacies are 
not usually stated in the syllogistic form, but rather shun that 
as the light that exposes them, and seek the enthymeme and 
other abridged forms under which to conceal their deformity. 
Whenever the student has a doubt as to the validity of an 
argument, he should at once write it out in the syllogistic 
form, using the symbols, which of themselves will go far to- 



58 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

ward detecting the fallacy, and utterly prevent the fifth form, 
as there are only three symbols to be used. 

EXAMPLE OF UNDISTRIBUTED MIDDLE. 
All good fathers provide for the physical wants of their children. 
Eli of old thus provided for his children. 
Therefore Eli of old was a good father. 

Or by symbols thus : 

All X is Y, 
All Z is Y, 
All Z is X. 

Y is the middle term, and is undistributed, being the predi" 
cate of both the affirmative premises. In other words, it is 
not a medium of comparison between X and Z, and the fallacy 
is in making Z agree with X when no comparison has been 
instituted between them. 

EXAMPLE OF ILLICIT PROCESS. 
All responsible beings are accountable. 
Brutes are not responsible beings.- 
Therefore brutes are not accountable. 

By symbols thus : 

All X is Y. 
No Z is X. 
No Z is Y. 

Here Y is distributed in the conclusion, but not distributed 
in the major premise, therefore it is called illicit process of the 
major term. 

The deceptive character of this fallacy is, that while prob- 
ably no one will deny the conclusion, yet it does not arise 
from the premises. It is for this reason called illicit, or un- 
lawful process, because it professes to come from the premises 
when it does not. 

Those who use these fallacies through design, generally 
combine many single forms into one compound argument so 
as to cover up the weakness of each form. In such cases the 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 59 

student should examine each proposition, and subject it to 
the tests of the dictum, and axioms and rules already laid 
down. 

INFORMAL FALLACIES. 

According to the principle of contradiction, every conclu- 
sion either does or does not follow from the premises. If it 
does not follow, then it is a formal fallacy under one of the 
classes mentioned. If the conclusion does follow from the 
premises, and yet when written out by the symbols the fallacy 
does not appear, you may know the fault is not in the" reason- 
ing, but in the subject matter of the propositions, with which 
Logic has nothing to do ; hence it is called an informal fallacy. 
When propositions are presented lor ratiocination, Logic takes 
it for granted that they are true as propositions, and only as- 
sumes to show correct conclusions from the propositions as 
given. 

If we have the general symbolic proposition that X is Y, 
and you choose to attach to X the meaning learning, and to 
Y the meaning preposterous, Logic will show you the correct 
conclusion, which is from the data, Learning is preposterous. 
If you object to this, Logic says, It is not my fault; I only 
show you the conclusion from your premises. 

Informal fallacies may all be classed under two heads, viz : 

i. Error of the premise. 

2. Error of the conclusion. 

Under the first division we have the petitio principii, which 
is called in English begging the question; arguing in a circle ; 
non causa pro causa, .which assigns a false, or undue cause. 
These, all being errors in the premise, are somewhat similar. 

The petitio principii uses a premise to support an adopted 
conclusion, as if one should say: " Morphia produces sleep 
because it is an anodyne," which is simply saying, Morphia 
produces sleep because it produces sleep. 



60 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

As an example of arguing in a circle we may give this : A 
man undertakes to prove the existence of God by the Bible, 
and then establishes the inspiration of the Bible from the fact 
that it came from God. 

EXAMPLE. 

Whatever the Bible says is true. 

It says there is a God. 

Therefore it is true that there is a God. 

The word of God is true. 

The Bible is the word of God. 

Therefore it is true. 

Here the existence of God is sought to be proven by the 
Bible, and then the truth of the Bible is to be proven by God's 
veracity. The conclusions are true, but do not arise from 
the argument given. 

The non causa pro causa is illustrated by the many prevalent 
forms of superstition that might be mentioned, as for instance, 
assigning an eclipse of the sun or moon as the cause of war 
or famine. 

ERRORS IN THE CONCLUSION. 

These are all included under the technical name of Ignora- 
iio elenchi, which means an irrelevant conclusion. 

EXAMPLE. 

All who found universities are patrons of learning; 
Alfred the Great founded the University of Oxford ; 
Therefore he tvas a scholar. 

The conclusion is irrelevant; it should.be, he was a patron 
of learning. 

Under this head may be classed the following informal 
fallacies : 

Argumentum ad ho mine ni, which is an unfair appeal to one's 
vanity or prejudice. It is used when one has no argument by 



LOGIC IN lO CHAPTERS. 6l 

simply appealing to his adversary, and saying, ' ' Well, you do n't 
believe it anyway." 

In like manner the argumentum ad populum is used to whole 
assemblies and peoples. It is the logic of the demagogue to 
inflame passion and excite prejudice. 

The argumentum ad verecundiam relates to the modesty of 
an individual which should prevent him from opposing the 
opinions of the "fathers." 

These last three forms are not necessarily fallacies, but are 
most likely to be so used. They may often be used correctly 
and forcibly, as when Nathan said to David, "Thou art the 

man." 

VERBAL FALLACIES. 

These are fallacies growing out of words which are used 
ambiguously, and generally in the middle term, as: 

A pagan is a disbeliever in Christ ; 

Every villager is a pagan ; 

Therefore every villager is a disbeliever in Christ. 

The word nothing may be made to yield a fruitful crop of 
these fallacies, as : 

Nothing is whiter than snow, 

And nothing is blacker than a crow. 

Nothing is a jug-full of emptiness, etc. 

Nothing is better than health. 
A shilling is better than nothing. 
Therefore a shilling is better than health. 

No cat has two tails. 

Pussy has one more tail than no cat. 

Therefore Pussy has three tails. 

POPULAR FALLACIES. 

These are such as a nation, an age, or a race will unite on, 
and refuse to be divorced therefrom. For instance, a Russian 



62 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

claims that absolute monarchy is the best form of government, 
while the English believe in a limited monarchy. 

Nil de mortuis nisi bonum may be a popular fallacy, but is 
not necessarily so. In like manner De gustibus non est dispu- 
tandnm may be so used. 

Among these may be classed the fallacy of siveeping classifi- 
cation. It consists in ascribing to one person what belongs to 
another, simply because they are both of the same class. 
Examples of this may be seen in the persecution of one king 
because another may be cruel. 

The " No precedent argument'" is another form of popular 
fallacies. It is used thus : That measure will not do because 
it is entirely new and unheard of; there is no precedent for it. 

These popular fallacies are only mentioned here to put the 
student on his guard as to their use, for they may often be 
used as correct forms of arguments. 

SYLLABUS. 

This chapter treats of fallacies which are defined to be in- 
valid arguments in the form of valid ones. When they are 
used to deceive they are called by the name of Sophisms. 
There are two general classes of fallacies — Formal and In- 
formal. The former violate the ?ules of Logic, and are there- 
fore logical fallacies, which appear under five different forms, 
which were enumerated and explained in the foregoing 
chapter. 

The Informal fallacies do not strictly belong to Logic, as 
they do not violate its rules and axioms, but occur in the sub- 
ject-matter of the propositions with which Logic has nothing 
to do. The reason for noticing them is given in their pre- 
sentation, as well as the different kinds recognized. 

Verbal fallacies were treated in the same way in this 
chapter. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 63 

A few cautions in the way of examples were also given to 
illustrate popular fallacies. 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. 

1. What is a fallacy ? 

2. What is a sophism ? 

3. Give the general division of fallacies. 

4. Name all the fallacies given. 

5. Which are logical and which not? , 



64 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 



CHAPTER IX. 

PECULIAR MODES OF SYLLOGISMS. 

There are three modes of using the Syllogism, called re- 
spectively, the Argument a priori, the Argument a posteriori, 
and the Argument a fortiori. We have already shown the 
use of the first two of these as applicable respectively to the 
Deductive and Inductive methods of reasoning, explained in 
Chapter V., and as they are said to be modes of the Syllogism, 
we will only add that they are appropriately applied to the 
Deductive and Inductive forms — the a priori to the deductive 
and the a posteriori to the inductive. 

ARGUMENT A FORTIORI. 

This we define to be an argument of a stronger form, and 
as the Syllogism is the ultimate form of the argument, it is the 
stronger form Syllogism . 

It is also a peculiar form as well as the stronger form. 

We submit the following to show its form : 

A horse is stronger than a man. 
An elephant is stronger than a horse. 
A fortiori, An elephant is stronger than a man. 

The a fortiori means here for a stronger reason, the elephant 
is stronger than a man, since the horse is stronger than man, 
and the elephant is stronger than the horse. 

Julius Caesar, who was a logician as well as an orator and 
warrior, used this powerful argument to recover his army from 
a panic brought on by a rumor that the Germans were fierce 
warriors of giantlike forms. His argument ran thus : 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 65 

The Helvitians have conquered the Germans in many battles. 

The Romans (you) have conquered the Helvitians. 

For a stronger reason, the Romans can conquer the Germans. 

This chapter being very short and simple, we will give no 
Syllabus nor practical questions, admonishing the student to 
make himself fully acquainted with what is said of these pe- 
culiar forms in both this and the fifth chapter. 

We now close this chapter, and with it the elements of 
Logic as given first by Aristotle, and will devote the next to 
an exemplification of the Logic of Socrates, who in a philo- 
sophical relation is the grandfather of Aristotle. 



66 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

CHAPTER X. 

THE SOCRATIC METHOD OF REASONING. 

This method, as its name indicates, had its origin with 
Socrates, the illustrious Greek philosopher, 400 B. C, and 
presents very forcibly one of the leading traits of his philo- 
sophic mind, to-wit, that of professing to know nothing him- 
self, and constantly asking information of his antagonist until 
he had completely entangled him in his own web and net- 
work, when it would manifestly appear that all the informa- 
tion was on the side of the great Know-nothing, Socrates. 

This argument, or mode of argument, is conducted by a 
series of questions and answers, in which the questioner is 
finally the victor in the dispute, provided he has the inge- 
nuity to arrange the questions so as to make them both ex- 
haustive and conclusive. This requires no ordinary skill, 
but the sharpest penetration of intellect and the most skill- 
ful use of language are necessary for its consummation; yet 
it amply repays all outlays, for the victory, when achieved, is 
complete, and silences all cavilings. In fact, it partakes 
largely of demonstration itself. 

It is a fair method, and requires the parties to the contro- 
versy to be candid and sincere in the pursuit of truth. But, 
if the respondent should prove stubborn and evasive in his 
answers, or refuse to answer at all, he will inevitably fall by 
his own weapons. There is no escape for him except in the 
justice of his own cause, the want of it in his opponent's 
cause, or the weakness in its presentation. 

The very nature of the method implies an honest difference 
of opinion, and victory will perch on the side of the right if 
properly handled. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 6"J 

EXAMPLES OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD. 
Some years ago we prepared the following arguments to il- 
lustrate this method of reasoning to our Senior Class in college, 
and here present them for a similar purpose, with no disposi- 
tion whatever to influence any one to adopt the conclusions 

reached : 

Dialogue Between an Atheist axd a Deist. 

The course embraces three lectures, beginning with the 
Atheist as the character farthest removed from the spheres of 
belief in God and Revelation, and ending with the Infidel and 
Sceptic, who doubt and deny the divine origin of the Bible. 
The following lecture is No. i in the series, and is intended 
to bring out the point of difference between the Atheist and 
Deist. Hence these are the characters assumed : 

Deist. Do you believe that there is a God ? 

Atheist. As the expression is generally understood, I con- 
fess I do not. 

D. Do you admit your own existence and that of other 
things around you ? 

A. I certainly do. 

D. What evidence have you of it ? 

A. My own consciousness, which is the highest order of 
evidence we have of anything. 

D. Have you and the things _about you always existed? 

A. I readily admit that I have not, but cannot say as to 
the other things. 

D. Then you admit that something now exists ? 

A. I most certainly do. 

D. Since something now exists, something must always have 
existed, or else there was a time when nothing existed. Do 
you admit this ? 

A. I confess that is not only a logical, but a self-evident 
conclusion. It is axiomatic. 

D. Remember that existence is the thing insisted upon, and 



68 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. , 

you must now take one or the other horn of the dilemma; 
you must either admit that the things now existing have ex- 
isted always, and consequently are self-existent, or you must 
admit that they have not existed always, and consequently 
that they are not self-existent. Which horn will you take ? 

A. Yes, but we are finite beings, and cannot know whether 
they have existed always or not. 

D. Whether you know it or not, whether you admit it or 
not, right reason says one or the other must be true. You 
will not deny the authority of reason? 

A. I do not deny the authority of right reason. Sound 
human reason is the only guide we have. It is only the weak 
and silly that talk of faith and revelation. Reason alone is 
my guide. 

D. Since you have appealed to reason, to reason we will 
go. Reason says that the things now existing have either ex- 
isted always, or that they began to exist at some time past. 
One or the other is inevitable. Which horn of the dilemma 
will you take ? 

A. I confess that it seems that there is no course left me 
but to take one or the other horn of the dilemma, and I there- 
fore give it as my belief that they have not always existed. 

D. But I would remind you, my friend, of the fact that 
faith or " belief " constitutes no part of this argument, since 
you have renounced both and appealed to reason alone. To 
reason "we must go." Please be candid enough to say that 
all things have existed always or that they have not. 

A. I confess that reason says they have not existed always, 
and reason is my guide. 

D. Then they must have begun to exist at some past time? 

A. I admit that. 

D. Did they create themselves, or were they created by 
another? 

A. It is unreasonable to say they created themselves, for 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 6q 

that would imply that they existed before they began to exist, 
which is not only false to reason, but absolutely absurd. They 
were therefore created by another. 

D. Who, then, is this other that you say created the things 
now existing ? 

A. Reason teaches me that men and things are the result 
of fixed lazes. 

D. Granted, but did these laws fix themselves, or are they 
the creatures of another cause ? 

A. I regard everything as a result of fixed laws, and the 
laws themselves as eternal and unchangeable. 

D. Please tell us what we are to understand by "fixed 
laws" ? 

A. "Fixed" means established, and laws are regular 
methods or modes of action or operation. 

D. Very good. Then laws are nothing in themselves. 
According to your definition they are simply the modes of 
operation and methods by which certain phenomena follow 
certain causes. They have no force of themselves, but are 
only the manner of directing force. The cause is outside of 
the laws. The outside cause operates through these laws, 
as mere means. Is not this true ? 

A. I must admit that it is a just view of the matter. 

D. Then there is a cause — a force outside of the "fixed 
laws " which operates through them, and controls them, and 
ah things subject to them ? 

A. I cannot deny the conclusion. I was only mistaken 
as to where the force resides. I now surrender my theory, 
since the force is not inherent in fixed laws, which has been 
my pet theory. I see now it is impossible. 

D. I understand you to admit now that these "fixed laws " 
did not fix them themselves, and that there is a force superior 
to them ? 

A. I do. 



70 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

D. Then you must admit that this " superior force" is self- 
existent, or that some other, the cause of this, is so, since 
force cannot create itself any more than other things. 

A. I am free to admit that what you say is reasonable. 

D. That which is self-existent has always existed, else at 
some time it would have begun its own existence, which 
it could not do without having existed before it began 
to exist. Whatever exists of itself exists always and from 
all eternity, and it cannot cease to exist; its cause is 
within itself, and it exists by absolute necessity, because 
it cannot be otherwise than it is. For whatever can be 
otherwise is contingent, and is not necessary, but change- 
able. Therefore that which is self existent is eternal and un- 
changeable. 

A. I must admit your conclusions are just. 

D. Then there is but one more question between us. Is 
this self-existent, eternal, and unchangeable force the cause 
and creator of all things ? 

A. I admit there can be but one infinite cause without a 
conflict of infinities; that this one is the cause of all finite 
things, that it must be the perfection of every good quality, 
hence the self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, Almighty 
God — the sum of all good. 

Dialogue Between a Deist and a Christian. 

Christian. Do you believe in the existence of God? 

Deist. I do. 

C. Do you believe he is self-existent and eternal, and the 
Creator of all things ? 

D. I do. He is the cause in himself of his own existence, 
and hence exists from absolute necessity ; otherwise he would 
be contingent, and consequently changeable, for whatever 
does not exist of necessity is contingent, and is liable to 
change. I believe, also, that he is the Creator of all original 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 71 

things, and is their prime cause — " the Great First Cause least 
understood." 

C. Very good. Do you believe that God has made a 
written revelation of his will to man ? 

D. I do not. I believe the Bible to be a "cunningly de- 
vised fable," interesting in some respects, but very inconsist- 
ent with itself in others. 

C. Do you admit that the great principles taught in the 
Bible accord with right reason and sound morality ? 

D. That they may do ; I neither affirm nor deny. But ad- 
mitting they do ? it would not necessarily follow that they are 
from God, since men have taught many sound principles who 
knew nothing of the Bible, of which Socrates was an illustrious 
example. 

C. You admit that such a man as Socrates has lived then, 
I presume ? 

D. I do, most freely, and I admire his teachings. 

C. Enough of Socrates for the present; we may refer to 
him after a little. I presume you have read the decalogue 
delivered by Moses ? 

D. I have read Moses' Code, or the Ten Commandments. 

C. Do you admit that they teach sound morality, and ac- 
cord with right reason ? 

D. I do. But the same may be said of the Codes of Solon, 
Lycurgus, and Confucius. 

C. I presume, then, that you believe that Solon, Lycurgus, 
and Confucius all once lived in the world, and that each has a 
code of laws now extant in the world ? 

D. I certainly do, and think that the world has been bene- 
fitted by their having lived in it. 

C. Please be kind enough to state, now, upon what 
evidence you believe that they once lived in ages past, and 
were the authors of the codes bearing their respective names. 
Also state the same in reference to Socrates. 



72 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

D. We have the codes themselves as witnesses, and be- 
sides, there is the undoubted testimony of history concerning 
their writings, all brought down through the ages to us, with- 
out the least pretense of enthusiasm or miracles. 

C. But may it not be possible that these ancient codes and 
writings were the work of other men, and by mere fiction as- 
signed to those whose names they bear ? 

D. This would be impossible, since we find that they were 
all good men, and good men would not seek to impose upon 
their fellowmen in claiming the authorship of works not their 
own. Besides this, we have the testimony of contempora- 
neous witnesses to the fact that they were the authors of them, 
and that they were men incapable of an effort to impose upon 
and deceive their fellowmen. In addition to all this, they 
have been referred to as such authors from the very days 
when their works were written to the present, without a single 
denial, or even a question as to the genuineness of their au- 
thorship. There can be no mistake about the matter. The 
world has accepted them as the duly accredited authors for 
thousands of years, and it now, according to all rules of logic 
and equity, rests upon the disbeliever to prove that they were 
impostors. Established facts throw the burden of proof upon 
those who doubt them. 

C. I admit the correctness of your logic, and the inevitable 
conclusions to which your premises must lead every candid 
enquirer after truth, and all I ask of you now is to admit the 
same reasoning and conclusions when applied to another set 
of authors quite as prominent before the world as Solon, Ly- 
curgus and Confucius. I am glad to find that you have such 
unshaken confidence in the testimony of history, for the Bible 
has a history the most wonderful the world ever knew, and it 
is itself a history without an equal in the annals of time. And 
in order that we may fully understand each other, and avoid a 
war of words, let us recapitulate the points of evi dence in 



LOGIC IN TO CHAPTERS. 73 

your testimony of history. They are these: i. The doctrines 
of Socrates and others are still extant, and must severally 
have had an author. 2. They accord with right reason and 
sound morality. 3. They show that their authors must have 
been good men. 4. Good men will not seek to impose upon 
their fellow-men works not their own. 5. Contemporaneous 
authors and witnesses testify to their genuineness. 6. These 
writings were accepted and believed by the communities in 
which they were first published at the very time of their pub- 
lication. 7. They have been referred to ever since, and 
quoted from by other writers, as the productions of the men 
whose names they bear, and have thus been often tried and 
never denied. 8. And since their authenticity is now estab- 
lished, the burden of proof must rest upon those who doubt 
or deny them. Do you accept this as an exhaustive analysis 
of the testimony of history upon which you accept Socrates, 
Solon, Lycurgus, and Confucius as the authors of the works 
ascribed to them ? 
D. I do. 

C. Then I propose to apply your own arguments to Moses 
and the prophets, to Christ and the apostles, who are the au- 
thors of writings quite as well known to the world as any you 
have named. Are you willing to accept the force of your 
own logic ? 

D. To be candid, I confess that I cannot well object to 
the use you make of my argument, but I did not expect you 
to take such a turn as that. I presumed that you would rely 
mainly upon " miracles and prophecies," as you would term 
them, the existence of which I do not admit. 

C. Very good. We will talk about the "miracles and 
prophecies" after a while. "The undoubted testimony of 
history " is what I rely upon at present, and I am glad to 
know that we agree so well as to the validity of testimony by 



74 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

which our difference is to be settled. And now for the ap- 
plication of your argument, i. The writings and doctrines 
of Moses and the prophets, of Christ and the apostles, are 
now extant in the world, and have been for thousands of 
years, and there is no other accredited account of their au- 
thorship, except that which they claim for themselves. The 
world, for nearly two thousand years, has been unable, by all 
its wisdom, to prove any other account of their origin ; and 
since their claim to authorship is now well established, "the 
burden of proof rests upon those who doubt." 2. These 
writings and doctrines accord with right reason and sound 
morality. Nothing is more reasonable than that God, having 
created the world, and all things therein, as you yourself ad- 
mit, would reveal to man his origin, purpose, and destiny; 
and no system of morality ever taught is comparable with 
that of the Bible. 3. Hence, they show that their authors 
must have been good men ; for bad men would not write such 
a book as the Bible if they could, since it condemns them on 
every page. 4. Good men would not have sought to impose 
upon the world works which were not their own. 5. Con- 
temporaneous witnesses and authors testify both to the cha- 
racter of these authors and the genuineness of their produc- 
tions. 6. These writings and doctrines were accepted and 
believed by the communities in which they were first published, 
and at the very time of their publication, and thousands of 
persons became converts to their teachings, some of whom 
laid down their lives rather than deny or recant them ; and 
many others, while rejecting the doctrines, bore indisputable 
testimony that these very men were the authors of those doc- 
trines to the extent of beheading and executing them for the 
very reason that they had promulgated such doctrines. 7. 
These writings and doctrines have been referred to ever since 
their publication, by both friends and enemies, and quoted 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 75 

from by other writers as the productions of the men whose 
names they bear ; all of which goes to show, conclusively, 
that the writings in question are genuine. 8. Having been 
thus established, and so accepted by the world generally, the 
burden of proof now rests upon those who doubt and disbe- 
lieve them. Now, in all candor, I ask you if my authors do 
not come up as fully to the requirements of the eight points 
in the "undoubted testimony of history" as yours do; and 
if so, are not Moses and the prophets, Christ and the apostles, 
entitled to as much credit as Socrates and Solon, Lycurgus 
and Confucius? 

D. I must confess that they do, and that the one set of au- 
thors is as much entitled to credit as the other; and while I 
am compelled to admit that your authors are what they claim 
to be, yet I cannot believe what they say. For instance, I 
cannot believe the story of "miracles and prophecies." 

C. My dear sir, you must remember that we have agreed 
to be candid, and that one of the eight points admitted by 
you is, "that good men are incapable" of imposing upon 
their fellow-men, and you have admitted this point as applic- 
able to- my authors. 

D. I know I have, but as they were men they might have 
been mistaken about the matter. 

C. It is true they were men, but they say they saw the 
miracles, and some of them were subjects of them; and men 
cannot be adjudged as mistaken about what they clearly see 
and feel; they were conscious of the facts, and consciousness 
is the highest order of human testimony. Besides this, the 
Bible gives us a history of human affairs and civil govern- 
ments, as well as of miracles and prophecies. You accept 
the former as authentic; you cannot reject the latter, for we 
have the same historical evidence for the one as the other. 
The Bible testifies to both ; you cannot take part of a witness' 



76 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

testimony and reject the other. You must take it all or reject 
it all. Which will you do ? 

D. Candor compels me to accept it all. I therefore admit 
that I may have been mistaken, and that the Bible may be 
true. I will seriously reconsider the whole matter. 

C. I hope you will; and I feel confident that if you try as hard 
to believe it as you have to disbelieve it, you will find that the 
easiest and most rational view of the Scriptures is to accept 
them as true. 

Dialogue Between a Deist and a Christian, 
no. 3. 
Deist. I have considered the subject of our last interview, 
and although I admitted to you that the Bible might be true, 
I have some serious objections to offer against it as a revela- 
tion from God. 

Christian. I would be pleased to hear and try to remove 
any reasonable objections that may exist. 

D. Revelation means making clear to view, and that is the 
very thing the Bible does not do. It is the most mysterious 
book in existence. 

C. I presume you will admit that the works of creation and 
the laws of nature are a revelation from God? 

D. I certainly do; but man's eternal salvation does not de- 
pend on his understanding and obeying them. 

C. What is your reason for thinking it does not ? 

D. Well, I don't know that I have any particular reason, 
but I feel confident that it does not, and you Bible-men do 
not believe it. 

C. It does not matter what we " Bible-men " believe o*" 
teach ; you do not accept our teachings, and hence cannot use 
us as testimony. 

D. It is contrary to reason to think of man's eternal salva- 
tion being dependent upon physical laws. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 77 

C. That is only your assertion without stating how it 
contravenes reason. Now, suppose you subtract from 
your belief on that subject all that you have unconsciously 
gathered from the Bible in regard to man's eternal salvation, 
and then state distinctly your reason for believing man's eter- 
nal salvation does not depend upon physical laws. 

D. "Man is a spiritual being, and spirits are not governed 
by physical laws. 

C. Where did you learn the fact that man is a spiritual 
being ? 

D. I think that proposition is generally admitted. 

C. I acknowledge that it is ; but upon what authority is it 
admitted ? 

D. Well, it is taught by philosophers and school-men of all 
ages, both ancient and modern ; and their teachings on this 
subject, as well as on many others, have never been success- 
fully controverted. 

C. I admit all this, and will throw into the bargain ancient 
and modern logicians, and will now ask you to state the 
premises or the syllogism by which they prove that man is a 
spiritual being. 

D. I confess that I do not know upon what premises they 
teach it, but it is a well-known fact that all nations and ages 
have believed it more or less. Even the American Indians 
in a savage state talk of spirits, and the "Great Spirit," and 
bury their dead with all their hunting accoutrements, that 
they may have them in the spiritual word. 

C. I admit the truth of this, your last statement, through- 
out : First, that you do not know upon what authority it is 
taught, neither do I, nor they who teach it, unless they de 
rive it, directly or indirectly, from the Bible. Second, that all 
nations and ages have believed it more or less, even the 
savages of America, and I insist that they have all received 



78 LOGIC IN.IO CHAPTERS. 

the idea, directly or indirectly, from the Bible. But this is a 
point aside from our main issue. Let us bring it to a close. 
You hold that the idea that man is a spiritual being is in the 
world independent of the Bible, and I deny it. Now for 
your proof. 

D. I confess I have none, except what I have given, and 
candor requires me to admit that is not sufficient. 

C. You have given all that can be given, and it amounts to 
nothing. Without the Bible man knows not whence he came, 
what he is, nor whither he tends. Now, I presume you will ad- 
mit that the Bible teaches the doctrine of man's spirituality, 
whether you believe it is from God or not? 

D. I admit that it does. 

C. Well, now let us return to the previous question : Are 
the works and laws of nature a revelation from God ? 

D. They are; and the only revelation he has given of 
himself to man that is without serious objections. If the 
Bible be a revelation, it is full of mysteries and contradic- 
tions. 

C. Very well. I now propose to show you that your 
boasted revelation — the works of nature- — is as full of mys- 
teries and contradictions as the Bible, and even more so. 
And we will first consider the •'mysteries." Are there not 
many mysteries in the works of creation which you cannot 
comprehend? For instance, why are there chemical affinities 
between some substances and not between others? What is 
the cause of the attraction of gravitation? What is the 
physical constitution of the sun? Whence come its heat and 
light? Please explain any one of these upon known princi- 
ples. 

D. I admit at once that I cannot do it. 

C. Then we find as great mysteries in your revelation as in 
mine, and even greater. And now for the contradictions. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 79 

Please tell me what is more contradictory than the law that 
"heat expands and cold contracts," and yet that water both 
contracts and expands by freezing ? 

D. I admit that is one of the paradoxes of nature which 
cannot be explained at present. 

C. Why is it that the brain is the seat of sensation, and it 
is itself insensible ? 

D. That is another seeming paradox which cannot be ex- 
plained, and I am candid to admit that there are many such 
in nature. 

C. Then I hope you will admit without further argument 
that your natural revelation is as full of mysteries and contra- 
dictions as mine ? 

D. I feel bound to do so, as your arguments are unanswer- 
able. 

C. Then, since your revelation is seemingly full of mys- 
teries and contradictions, and yet you claim that it is from 
God, why not admit mine on the same parity of reasoning ? 

D. Men could have been the authors of the Bible but not 
creation. 

C. Yes, but you remember that we settled the point of au- 
thorship in our former interview, on the principle that none 
but good men are its authors, and if good men are its authors, 
what they say is true. They say it came from God, therefore 
it must be true. We are now discussing the objections you 
have offered to the Bible itself, and not its authorship. Please 
be candid, and state whether there are greater mysteries and 
contradictions in the Bible than in the book of nature, or 
whether they are both alike incomprehensible to finite minds 
in some parts, yet sufficiently comprehensible, if studied, to be 
of the greatest pleasure and utility to man. 

D. I confess that there are objections to both as regards 
mysteries and apparent contradictions, and that enough of 



8o LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

both may be understood to secure man's present and future 
interest. I now yield the point of dispute, and confess that 
deism is rather an excuse for neglect of written revelation 
than a reality. And this discussion has satisfied me that men 
object to many things which their finite minds cannot com- 
prehend; yet the things objected against remain true never- 
theless ; and that if they would be honest with themselves, 
and make the same efforts to remove the objections that they 
do to establish them, they would find it easier to believe than 
disbelieve the things objected to. 

C. Besides all this, the Bible has the following points of 
internal evidence which challenge refutation : i. It speaks as 
no man can speak. 2. It is the only rational account of 
man's origin and destiny extant. 3. It is a history of events 
so marvelous, yet so true to the attributes of God and the na- 
ture of man, that none but an infinite mind could have indited 
it. 4. It is reasonable that God, having created man with a 
moral nature, should give him a law to govern it, and as the 
Bible is the only book extant which has the necessary requi- 
sites for such a law, and as it would be unreasonable for a 
superior intelligence to create an inferior intelligence without 
some revelation to the latter as to the purposes of its creation, 
we readily conclude that the Bible is the revealed will of God 
to man, and will close the argument with the following Syllo- 
gism: 

If any plan could be devised by which the Bible could be shown 
to have been produced by human agency alone, it would have been 
do7ie before now : but no such plan has ever been devised : therefore 
none can be so devised. An infinite God finitely comprehended is 
no God at all. 



LOGIC IN 10 CHAPTERS. 



EXAMPLES. 

The following examples are given to test the student's 
knowledge of the various forms of arguments and fallacies 
which have now been presented to him in this little book. 
He should now be able to put each example in its proper 
form, name it, and show whether it is a valid, or invalid 
argument. Thus, e. g. : 

i. Ought we to act from expediency as a motive ? 
Let us syllogize it. 

We should always act from right as a motive. 

Expediency is sometimes right. 

Therefore we may sometimes act from expediency as a motive. 

2. Should children obey their parents ? 

Children should do whatever is right. 

It is right to obey our parents in some things. 

Therefore children should obey their parents in some things. 

3. Jesus wept. 

4. No evil should be done that good, may result; all pun- 
ishment is an evil ; therefore no punishment should be 
allowed. 

5. Every one desires happiness ; therefore every one desires 
virtue. 

6. No one is good who commits sin ; all men commit sin ; 
therefore there is none good except God. 

7. A designing man is not worthy of trust ; therefore en- 
gravers are not worthy of trust. 

8. Every American citizen should be free ; I am an Amer- 

6 



82 LOGIC IN 10 CHAPTERS. 

ican citizen ; therefore I should be allowed to do as I please. 

9. All that glitters is not gold ; tinsel glitters ; therefore 
tinsel is not gold. 

10. Happiness consists in obedience to the Divine laws; 
this obedience is virtuous conduct ; virtuous conduct is the 
subordination of the inferior to the superior in our nature; 
this is secured by self-control; therefore happiness is the 
result of self-control. 

11. We must do one of three things: Go back, stand still, 
or go forward in life. Formulate this so as to show which we 
must do. 

12. Cotton will either fall, remain as it is, or rise in the 
next ten days. Which ? 

13. Mr. Hurst said to Mr. Davids: " A man must either 
work, steal, or starve. You neither work, nor starve." "Sir, 
do you mean to insult me ?" inquired Mr. Davids, excitedly. 
" No, sir ; I only meant for you to draw your own conclusion 
from this dilemma," replied Mr. Hurst. What was that con- 
clusion ? 

14. What is the matter with this? From evil doers springs 
the making of good laws ; from good laws arises the safety of 
society ; from the safety of society all social good things flow. 
Therefore, from evil doers flow all good things to society. 

15. If men are to be punished hereafter God must be the 
punisher ; if God be the punisher, the punishment must be 
just; if the punishment is just the punished must be guilty; 
if they are gulity they could have acted otherwise ; if they 
could have acted otherwise they were free agents. There- 
fore, if men are liable to punishment in another world, they 
must be free agents. 

16. In this life we must either obey our vicious inclinations 
or resist them ; if we obey them we shall have sin and sorrow ; 
if we resist them we shall have pain and labor ; but we must 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 83 

either obey or resist them. Therefore we cannot be free from 
trouble in this life. 

17. All persecution for conscience's sake is displeasing to 
God, because it is injustice. All religious persecutions are 
for conscience's sake, because they assume to dictate to con- 
science. Therefore all religious persecution is displeasing to 
God. Give name to this and see if it is correct. 

18. No man can do these miracles which thou doest except 
God be with him. Therefore we know thou art a teacher 
sent from God. — Nicodemus. 

Put this into the Syllogistic form. 

19. No man can serve two masters. Ye cannot serve God 
and mammon. Put this into the simple Syllogistic form, and 
then into the compound hypothetical dilemma. 

20. Epimenides the Cretan says that "all the Cretans are 
liars;" but Epimenides himself is a Cretan; therefore he him- 
self is a liar. But if he be a liar, what he says is untrue, 
and consequently the Cretans are truthful. But Epimenides 
is a Cretan, and therefore what he says is true. And he says 
the Cretans are all liars. 

21. Since it is false that all men are liars, its contrary must 
be true, that no men are liars. 

22. Alexander was the son of Phillip, and by immediate 
inference, i. e., without a middle term, we can infer that 
Phillip was the father of Alexander. 

23. No cat has two tails. Any cat has one tail more than 
no cat ; therefore any cat has three tails. 

24. Eight hats cost $48. One hat will cost one-eighth of 
$48. Therefore one hat costs six dollars. 

PARLIAMENTARY RULES. 
Believing that a school should be a preparatory stage for 
after life, we hold that it should be conducted by the same 
rules which govern men in deliberative bodies, that is by 



84 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

Parliamentary law. This is the most natural method, since 
the school already has a presiding officer, and is divided into 
classes, or committees, with the head man as chairman. The 
recitation is simply the report of the committee, which each 
member is required to explain and discuss. And if this be 
done according to these rules, the students will feel quite 
at home after they leave school and enter the deliberative 
bodies in which the business and duties of citizenship are dis- 
charged. Entertaining this view of the subject, we subjoin 
the following brief summary of parliamentary rules : 



APPENDIX. 

PARLIAMENTARY LAWS. 

Every deliberative body should have a president, vice- 
president, secretary and treasurer, whose duties are prescribed 
in the written constitution. 

i. The president shall preserve order, and conduct all bus- 
iness before the body to a speedy and proper result. 

2. He shall rule the deliberations according to Parliamen- 
tary laws. 

3. He shall arise and present every subject to the body for 
deliberation. 

4. He shall appoint all committees not otherwise provided 
for. 

5. The president shall give the casting vote in cases of a 
tie, and vote last when the yeas and nays are called for and 
recorded. 

ORDER OF BUSINESS. 

i. Reading, correcting and approving the minutes. 

2. Communications received and disposed of. 

3. Reports of Standing committees. 

4. Reports of Select committees. 

5. Resolutions. 

Papers under each of these heads may be taken up when 
presented, by unanimous consent, but if any objection be 
offered, they must be entered on the docket. 



86 LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 

THE DOCKET. 

When the unfinished business and special orders have been 
disposed of, the business on the docket shall be taken up in 
the order in which it is docketed. Motions to elect officers, 
appoint committees, and enroll members are, however, always 
in order. 

MOTIONS. 

All motions must have a second, and be re-stated by the 
president, before it is debatable; but this does not prevent 
the mover from explaining his motion. Every motion should 
be reduced to writing, if requested by a member. 

The mover is entitled to the floor first in the discussion, if 
he desire it. 

Every member must rise to his feet before addressing the 
chair, or offering a motion, or resolution. 

Any motion may be withdrawn by the mover with the con- 
sent of the second before any debate is had ; otherwise it 
cannot be done without the unanimous consent of the body. 

A motion to postpone to a day certain, to commit, or to 
postpone, being decided in the negative, shall not again be 
allowable on the same day. 

A motion to refer to a standing committee takes precedence 
over one to refer to a select committee. 

A motion to take up any item of business being negative, 
shall not be renewed before the intervention of other business 

A motion to adjourn to a day certain is debatable, and may 
be amended as to time. 

UNFINISHED BUSINESS. 

The next item is the unfinished business in which the body 
was engaged at the last preceding adjournment, which takes 
preference over orders of the day, but may be, on motion, 



Logic in 16 chapters. 87 

postponed in order to take up special orders of the day. 

No motion can be entertained while a member has the floor, 
or while a vote is being taken. 

A motion to adjourn being negatived shall not be renewed 
until some other business shall have been transacted. 

A motion being tabled, disposes of the matter during the 
pleasure of the body. It can be called up whenever the 
body so decides. 

A motion being indefinitely postponed cannot be renewed 
during the session, except by reconsidering the vote. 

Any motion under debate, and being susceptible of division 
into parts, may be divided on the request of any one member, 
and the vote taken on each part separately. 

When a motion to close debate prevails, it stops all discus- 
sion on the main and all collateral questions. 

The secretary must read any motion or paper before the 
body whenever the reading is called lor by a member , and if 
a second reading be objected to, the call for it may then 
assume the form of a privileged motion, and be decided by 
vote as any other motion. 

A member may appeal from the decision of the president 
to the body, which shall be decided without debate. 

Motions should be repealed by the same vote that adopted 
them : but it requires a unanimous vote of those present to 
expunge anything from the minutes. 

LIMITATIONS OF DEBATE. 

Motions to table, to docket, to take up business, to adjourn, 
to close debate, and the call for the question shall be put 
without debate. Members shall not speak more than once 
on any question until all have spoken who are desirous of 
speaking, and not more than twice without permission from 
the presiding officer. 



88 LOGIC IN TO CHAPTERS. 

PRIVILEGED QUESTIONS. 

When a motion is being considered, no motion is in order, 
except to adjourn, to docket, to lay on the table, to amend, 
to postpone to a time certain, to postpone indefinitely, or 
commit ; and these only in the order of precedence here given. 

The motion to adjourn is always in order, except when a 
member has the floor, or while a vote is being taken. 

When " the question is called," it shall be put in the usual 
way, without debate. 

AMENDMENTS. 

Any motion may be amended twice and only twice, and 
the vote on the amendments shall be taken before that on the 
original motion. 

One motion may become the substitute for another, pro- 
vided it coyer all the matter in the original. 

Any question can be reconsidered, provided a member who 
voted in the affirmative makes the motion, and it requires 
the same vote that adopted it. 

In all cases of question the president shall decide which 
speaker is entitled to the floor. No speaker shall be inter- 
rupted, except to call him to order, correct mistakes and 
misrepresentations. The speaker must address the presiding 
officer with respect, and treat him and all members in the 
same manner. 

VOTING. 

Each member is required to vote, unless he shall have been 
excused by the body. 

In filling blanks the vote shall always be taken on the 
longest time, and largest number first. 

The yeas and nays may be recorded when required by one- 
fifth of the members present. 



LOGIC IN IO CHAPTERS. 89 

When the report of a committee has been received, it is 
competent to concur, non-concur, adopt, refer, recommit 
with or without instructions, or to amend. 

The points not herein covered can be determined by refer- 
ence to Jefferson's or Cushing's Manual of Parliamentary 
Laws. 



OPINIONS OF THE WORK. 



Those, to whom this work is submitted for examination, are requested 
to record here briefly their candid opinions of the merits of the fore- 
going treatise on Logic. 

From Col. ED. IV. MUNFORD, a scholar and lawyer of prominence : 
I have no hesitation in commending the work on Logic by Prof. 
Burney. Its plan is original and gives to the students a much clearer 
conception of the principles of Logic and their practical application in 
the processes of reasoning than any work on the subject with which I 
am acquainted. I think it should by all means be printed and intro- 
duced into the schools of the country generally. 

ED. W. MUNFORD. 

From Col. C. C. CLEMEN T, a distinguished editor and scholar : 

Prof. Burney — It gives me pleasure to be able to say of the work 
on Logic, which I took occasion carefully to review, that I consider it 
one of the best compendiums upon that subject with which I am 
acqainted ; and for brevity, conciseness, adaptability and the general 
need, meets a desideratum long felt in the schools of high grade all 
over the land. 

C. C. CLEMENT. 
McMinnville, March 2d, 1881. 

From Dr. T. C. BLAKE, author of a number of works oiz Theology, 
and late Professor of Mathematics in Cttmberland University :. 

I have carefully examined the manuscript copy of Prof. A. M. 
Burney's treatise on Logic, and, without hesitation, pronounce it the 
best compend on the subject that I have ever seen. It should, by all 
means, be published, and be made a text-book in all of our schools. 
There is no work extant, within my knowledge, so well calculated to 
impart a correct knowledge of this important science. So clear and 
lucid are his definitions, and so simple, yet so comprehensive are his 
methods of inculcating the correct mode of reasoning that the work 
can not fail to interest both teacher and pupil. Indeed, with such a 
text-book, the science of Logic, which has heretofore been regarded 
as one of the most barren and unprofitable, not to say incomprehensible, 
can not fail to be studied, not only with profound interest, but with 
great profit. 

T. C. BLAKE. 

Nashville, Tenn., March 29, 1881. 



F?-oni R. A. CLARK, Professor of Mathemathics, Winchester Norfnal : 

I regard the work on Logic, by Prof. A. M. Burney, now in manu- 
script, well worthy of publication. I would be glad to see it in print. 

R. A. CLARK. 
Winchester, Term.. Sept. 14, 1881. 

From ex- Gov. MARKS, a distinguished jurist : 

The "little book" of Prof. A'. M. Burney, upon Logic, if published, 
will supply a long felt want. In a brief compass he develops all that 
is worth knowing upon the subject he treats in a clear and simple 
manner. 

ALBERT S. MARKS. 

From R. V. FOS TER, Professor of Hebrew and Biblical Literature in 
Cumberland University : 
It is a first-rate work, and well adapted to give the learner a good 
idea of the "Art of Reasoning." 

R. V. FOSTER. 

From Dr. S. G. BURNEY, Senior Professor in the Theological School 
of Cumberland University : 
Having examined this text-book on Elementary Logic, by A. M. 
Burney, I heartily concur with others as to its high merit, and recom- 
mend its publication ; also its adoption as a text-book in schools 
of all classes. 

S. G. BURNEY. 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proce 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Sept. 2004 

PreservationTechnologii 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PHESEBVMI 

111 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724) 779-21 1 1 



